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The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the
Relationship
Michael H. Graham*
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides
that criminal defendants have the right to be confronted with
the witnesses against them.1 One category of cases commonly
arising under the confrontation clause involves the admissibil-
ity of out-of-court statements.2 These cases address the ques-
tion of whether a nontestifying declarant's out-of-court
statement that is admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule may be admitted under the confrontation clause. The
question implicates the confrontation clause's core value of al-
lowing criminal defendants to confront witnesses against them.3
Recent cases have produced uncertainty about the complex
relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. A restricted version of this
Article was presented as the 1987 Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture at the Judge
Advocate General's College of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him....").
2. The United States Supreme Court explained in California v. Green
that confrontation clause cases fall into two broad categories. 399 U.S. 149, 157
(1970). One category involves the admission of out-of-court statements, and
the other involves the legal or court-imposed restrictions on the scope of cross-
examination. Id. Because the first category involves the "literal right to 'con-
front' the witness" at trial, it implicates the "core of the values furthered by
the Confrontation Clause." Id. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 70-71
(1980) (concluding that questioning of a witness as a hostile witness had been
the functional equivalent of cross-examination and therefore substantially
complied with. the confrontation requirement); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
86, 89 (1970) (finding that purpose of confrontation clause to aid jury in deter-
mining accuracy is satisfied if out-of-court statement has sufficient indicia of
reliability).
3. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985) (per curiam) (sug-
gesting that a witness's lapse of memory "may so frustrate any opportunity for
cross-examination" that admission of direct testimony would violate confronta-
tion clause); supra note 2.
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rule.4 Confrontation clause analysis focuses on whether the de-
clarant of an admissible hearsay statement testifies in court,
whether the declarant is available but does not testify, or
whether the declarant is unavailable.5 If the declarant does not
testify, confrontation clause analysis then inquires as to the re-
liability or trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement.6 The
United States Supreme Court has stated that for confrontation
clause purposes reliability may be inferred when the statement
falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or has "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness."7 Despite the implica-
tion that the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule serve
the same function, the Court has nevertheless stated that the
confrontation clause is not a codification of the hearsay rule.8
The problem therefore remains of defining the relationship be-
tween the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule by recon-
ciling the availability and reliability concerns of the
confrontation clause with the availability and reliability con-
cerns expressed in the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Additional concerns further muddle the problem. When
concepts of the importance of the testimony, the utility of
cross-examination, and the burden on the prosecution of pro-
ducing an available declarant or establishing unavailability are
added to traditional reliability confrontation clause analysis,
and the concepts of necessity and the adversary system are ad-
dressed in the hearsay analysis, the state of the relationship
moves from complex, to confusing, to downright confused. At
an operational level, many parts of the relationship create little
real controversy even though their theoretical underpinnings
are unclear. In other areas, however, the confusion has led to
significant litigation.
Recent legislative responses to the revelation of widespread
child sexual abuse9 will result in courts examining with in-
creasing regularity the relationship between the confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule. This Article addresses the state of
the relationship between the confrontation clause, the hearsay
rule, and child sexual abuse prosecutions. Part I of the Article
presents a hypothetical case of child sexual abuse and in-
troduces six hearsay statements, each of which requires exami-
4. See infra notes 118-72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 68-202 and accompanying text.
6. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
7. Id.
8. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
9. See infra notes 50, 184.
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nation under the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause for
admission into evidence. Part II considers the admissibility of
the statements under traditional hearsay exceptions, residual
and special statutory exceptions emphasizing particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, and statutory exceptions for
videotaped statements. Part III of the Article, focusing on the
factors of availability of the hearsay declarant and reliability of
the hearsay statement, discusses the current interpretation of
the confrontation clause and addresses the confrontation clause
issues attendant to admitting hearsay statements in evidence.
Part IV discusses the dilemma created by the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on the requirements of the con-
frontation clause with respect to the admissibility of hearsay
statements. It discusses the problems with commentators' sug-
gested interpretations of the confrontation clause and specifi-
cally addresses the confrontation clause issues in child sexual
abuse prosecution. Part V proposes a new interpretation of the
confrontation clause that limits application of the confrontation
clause to the admissibility of hearsay statements that were ac-
cusatory when made. The Article concludes that current con-
frontation clause analysis is flawed and that the Article's
suggested approach would better serve the purposes of the con-
frontation clause while avoiding constitutionalizing the hearsay
rule and its exceptions.
I. HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A mother leaves her six-year-old daughter, Alice, in the
custody of the mother's live-in boyfriend, Sam. Eight hours af-
ter Alice returns to her mother's care, her mother asks her
how she enjoyed her time with Sam. Alice tells her mother
that Sam touched her genital area. Alice's mother is unsure
whether to believe her. She confronts Sam, but he denies the
incident. The mother takes no further action. Five days later
the mother again leaves Alice in Sam's custody. This time Sam
attempts anal intercourse. Fifteen minutes after the attempt,
Alice, still in a state of fear, anger, and pain, runs out of the
house and sees her mother walking up the sidewalk. Using lan-
guage uncharacteristically crude for most six-year-old girls, Al-
ice screams that Sam has sexually assaulted her. Alice and her
mother hurry to a nearby police station where Alice excitedly
repeats her accusation to the desk officer. Twenty minutes
later, after calming considerably, Alice repeats her accusation
in a videotaped interview conducted by a member of the local
1988]
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child sexual abuse task force. A police officer then takes Alice
and her mother to a hospital emergency room for an examina-
tion. Alice tells the doctor that a few days ago Sam touched
her genital area and that today he attempted anal intercourse.
A medical examination reveals trauma in the rectal area.
Three weeks before Sam's trial, a police officer conducts a
videotaped interview of Alice for use at trial. Neither side has
an attorney present at the videotaping.
For Alice's out-of-court hearsay statements to be admissi-
ble in a criminal prosecution of Sam, her statements must meet
the requirements of both a hearsay exception and the confron-
tation clause. Admission of the statements may be critical to
Sam's successful prosecution.
II. APPLICABILITY OF HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS TO
ALICE'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
A. HEARSAY ExCEPTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which codify firmly
rooted common law hearsay exceptions, several hearsay excep-
tions may apply to Alice's statements, regardless of Alice's
availability to testify at trial. Alice's two statements to her
mother and her statement to the desk officer, for example,
must be analyzed under the hearsay exceptions for present
sense impressions and excited utterances. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803 provides a hearsay exception for a present sense im-
pression, which is "[a] statement describing or explaining an
event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter."10 Alice's first
statement to her mother, which described the touching, obvi-
ously was not a present sense impression because it was made
at least eight hours after the event. Likewise, but less obvi-
ously, Alice's second statement to her mother, which described
the attempted anal intercourse, was not a present sense impres-
sion because Alice did not make it while perceiving the event,
and fifteen minutes is too long to fall within the "immediately
thereafter" provision of the rule.': Thus, neither statement to
10. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
11. See Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422, 426 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(indicating that a statement made 15 minutes after the event is likely inadmis-
sible under the present sense impression exception, which allows only a slight
lapse of time between event and statement).
[Vol. 72:523
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Alice's mother would be admissible under the exception for
present sense impressions.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 also provides a hearsay ex-
ception for an excited utterance, which is "[a] statement relat-
ing to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by tlie event or con-
dition."12 Admissibility of Alice's first statement is more likely
under this exception than under the present sense impression
exception because lapse of time between the startling event and
the out-of-court statement, although relevant to show the ex-
cited nature of the statement, is not dispositive.13 Nor is it dis-
positive that Alice made her statement in response to her
mother's inquiry.' 4 Rather, these are only factors which the
trial court must consider in deciding whether to admit the
statement under the excited utterance exception. Other factors
include the declarant's age; her physical, mental, and, most im-
portantly, emotional condition when making the statement; the
circumstances of the event; and the statement's subject mat-
ter.15 Courts applying the excited utterance exception must
find that the statement was spontaneous rather than the prod-
uct of deliberation.16 Although courts have been liberal in
child sexual abuse cases in admitting hearsay statements under
the excited utterance exception,17 it is doubtful that Alice's
first statement to her mother would be admitted. Because Al-
ice made the statement calmly in response to her mother's gen-
eral question eight hours after the event, it is difficult to
characterize the statement as spontaneous.
Alice's second statement to her mother and her statement
to the desk officer, on the other hand, fall clearly within the
excited utterance exception. Made while in a state of fear, an-
ger, and pain, both statements were spontaneous rather than
deliberate.
12. FED. R. EvIm. 803(2).
13. State v. Ramirez, 46 Wash. App. 223, 230, 730 P.2d 98, 102 (1986) (hold-
ing admissible under a state statute a victim's statement to her mother made
five hours after startling event and recognizing that five hours might not de-
feat the "spontaneous declaration" element of the excited utterance excep-
tion); see infra note 17.
14. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
16. FED. R. EviD. 803(2).
17. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 23, 697 P.2d 836, 842 (1985) ("Courts
have thus tended to stretch existing hearsay exceptions to accommodate a
child victim's out-of-court statements because they are deemed uniquely neces-
sary and trustworthy.").
1988]
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Alice's videotaped statement to the child sexual abuse task
force member twenty minutes after arriving at the police sta-
tion does not meet the requirements of any traditional hearsay
exception. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides a hearsay ex-
ception for public records.18 The public records exception, how-
ever, does not apply in criminal cases to matters observed by
law enforcement personnel. 19 Because the task force member
may properly be considered law enforcement personnel, Alice's
videotaped statement is not admissible under the exception.
Moreover, no second-level hearsay exception applies to Alice's
statement.20 Alice was sufficiently calm after her twenty-min-
ute wait to preclude admission of her statement as an excited
utterance. Thus, neither Alice nor the task force member may
present the statement at trial.
Alice's videotaped statement to the police three weeks
before trial likewise fails to meet the requirements of any hear-
say exception. The public records exception does not apply be-
cause Alice made the statement to a police officer for use in a
criminal case.21 Nor does the excited utterance exception apply
because Alice was certainly not sufficiently excited three weeks
before trial.22 Thus, neither Alice nor the police officer may
present the statement at trial.
Alice's statement to the emergency room doctor must be
evaluated in light of the medical diagnosis or treatment excep-
tion. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides for admissibility of
statements of past or present physical condition made for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment. 23 Two possible barri-
ers to admissibility exist in Alice's case. The medical diagnosis
or treatment exception assumes that the statements are relia-
ble because the declarant is aware of the importance of telling
the truth to secure proper medical care.24 It is questionable
18. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
19. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). The public records exception excepts from
the hearsay prohibition "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies." FED. R. EVID. 803(8). The exception,
however, excludes "in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel." Id. at 803(8)(B).
20. But see infra note 26.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
23. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
24. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980) (explain-
ing that patient has a strong motive to tell the truth "because diagnosis or
treatment will depend in part upon what the patient says"), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981).
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whether Alice at the age of six was so aware. The part of the
statement identifying Sam as the alleged offender, moreover,
usually would be relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment25
only if treatment included removing Alice from the threat of
future sexual abuse by Sam or obtaining information useful for
future psychological counseling of Alice. The clear trend of au-
thority is to admit identifying statements in child sexual abuse
prosecutions.26
Alice's statements to her mother, the desk officer, the task
force member, the doctor, and the police officer three weeks
before trial each possess indicia of reliability because they de-
scribe an embarrassing fact that a child would not normally
convey unless true and they are cries for help.27 Nevertheless,
no traditional common law hearsay exception applies to embar-
25. The identity of the alleged perpetrator may be relevant to medical di-
agnosis or treatment if an examination of the perpetrator would assist in de-
termining the presence of venereal disease.
26. See, e.g., People v. Wilkins, 134 Mich. App. 39, 45, 349 N.W.2d 815, 817-
18 (1984) (upholding the admission of a sexually abused child's statement to
her doctor identifying the child's stepfather as the perpetrator); see also
United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Statements by
a child abuse victim... that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate
household are reasonably pertinent to treatment.... The exact nature and
extent of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often de-
pend on the identity of the abuser.") (emphasis in original); Goldade v. State,
674 P.2d 721, 726 (Wyo. 1983) ("It is apparent from the testimony of the physi-
cian... that he was involved in attempting to diagnose and, if diagnosed, to
then treat child abuse, not simply bruises on the little girl's face. The identity
of the person causing those injuries is a pertinent fact in these circum-
stances."), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
The successful prosecution of child sexual abuse cases should not be per-
mitted to distort the hearsay exception for statements for medical diagnosis or
treatment. Almost anything is relevant to the diagnosis or treatment of psy-
chological well being, and far too many untrustworthy statements are relevant
to preventing repetition of the abuse. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) should
remain restricted to statements pertinent to physical medical diagnosis or
treatment. Courts may admit other statements possessing adequate indicia of
trustworthiness under the residual hearsay exceptions of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and, most importantly, specific hearsay exceptions
applicable solely in child sexual abuse prosecutions.
Moreover, the medical diagnosis or treatment exception should not be ex-
tended to statements made to social workers, such as Alice's statement to the
task force member. Although such extension is possible, see, e.g., United
States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (extending residual excep-
tions to child's out-of-court statement made to social worker), it is inadvisable.
27. Alleged incidents of false accusations of child sexual abuse have led to
the formation of a group called Victims of Child Abuse Laws (VOCAL). This
group claims to have members in 48 states. For a discussion of VOCAL, see
Dorschner, A Question of Innocence, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985 (Tropic Mag-
azine), at 23.
1988]
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rasing statements or cries for help. The closest analogy in com-
mon law is the admissibility of prompt complaints in rape or
sexual abuse cases to corroborate the in-court testimony of the
complainant. Prompt complaint evidence, however, tradition-
ally is limited to the fact of the complaint and excludes any ref-
erence to the identity of the offender or the details of the
offense. 28
Alice's statements possess additional indicia of reliability
because they describe events that a six-year-old girl is not
likely to know may occur between an adult male and a young
girl. The statements possess further indicia of reliability be-
cause Alice used language that was atypical of a six-year-old
girl living in most communities in this country. Nevertheless,
no traditional hearsay exception exists for statements of a
young child that are reliable because their contents or language
are unlikely to have been said or used by a six-year-old child.
It is thus likely in our hypothetical case that under the Federal
Rules of Evidence hearsay exceptions, without regard to Alice's
availability as a witness at Sam's trial, some but not all of Al-
ice's statement will be admitted in evidence.
B. PARTICULARIZED GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
As noted above,2 9 three of Alice's statements are likely to
be admissible under common law or Federal Rules of Evidence
hearsay exceptions even if Alice is available to testify at Sam's
trial. Alice's other statements would not meet the require-
ments of any traditional hearsay exception in the Federal Rules
and therefore would be inadmissible. Two avenues remain,
however, for the admission of these hearsay statements. One is
found in the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are
available under the Federal Rules of Evidence and some state
evidence codes modeled on the Federal Rules.3 0 The other is
found in special statutory hearsay exceptions for child sexual
abuse prosecutions.3 '
1. Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
A child's hearsay statement may be admissible under the
28. Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILAmEE L. REv. 489, 492 (1983).
29. See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
30. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); see also REv. UNIF. R. EVID. 803(24),
804(b)(6) (1974) (containing same language as Federal Rules).
31. See infra note 50.
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residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, codified in Federal
Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5). 32 These two Rules are
identical except Rule 804(b)(5) requires that the declarant be
unavailable to testify at trial.33 Both Rules contain several
requirements that hearsay statements must meet to be
admissible.34
The most significant requirement is that the statement pos-
sess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to
those of statements admitted under one of the traditional hear-
say exceptions.3 5 Courts consider several criteria in evaluating
the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement, including the credi-
bility of the statement and the declarant at the time of the
statement in light of the declarant's personal knowledge,36 the
availability of time to fabricate,37 the declarant's bias,38 and the
32. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding admissible a child victim's hearsay statements to social worker under
FED. R. EvWD. 803(4), 803(24)); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding admissible a child sex abuse victim's hearsay statements,
testified to by the foster mother, under FED. R. EvID. 803(24)).
33. Compare FED. R. EviD. 803(24) (applying when declarant is available
to testify at trial) with FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (applying when declarant is un-
available to testify at trial).
34. Hearsay statements must meet the following requirements to be ad-
missible: (1) the hearsay statement must possess guarantees of trustworthi-
ness equivalent to that of statements admitted under the specific exceptions;
(2) the hearsay statement must be offered as evidence of a material fact; (3)
the hearsay statement must be more probative on the point it supports than
any other evidence which the proponent can reasonably obtain; (4) admission
of the hearsay statement must be in accord with the general purposes of the
rules of evidence; and (5) the proponent of the hearsay statement must give
sufficient notice. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See also M. GRAHAM, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.24, at 923-25 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the
five express requirements contained in FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5)).
35. Traditional hearsay exceptions are the first 23 exceptions in FED. R.
EVM. 803 and the first four exceptions in FED. R. EVID. 804(b). FED. R. EvID.
803(24) advisory committee's note.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) ("Mhe trial court should consider the declarant's
relationship with both the defendant and the government,. . . the extent to
which the testimony reflects the declarant's personal knowledge, and the
existence of corroborating evidence available for cross-examination.").
37. A court is more likely to admit statements made soon after the event
than statements made long after the event, and it is more likely to admit ini-
tial statements than subsequent statements. See supra notes 10 & 16 and ac-
companying text. Nevertheless, although time and sequence are important,
they are not dispositive because delay in reporting and vacillation are com-
monly associated with complaints of child sexual abuse. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 962 (considering "declar-
ant's motivation to testify").
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suggestiveness created by leading questions.3 9 Courts further
consider other, corroborating factors arising after the statement
was made, including the credibility of the person testifying to
the statement,40 the availability of the declarant at trial for
cross-examination (obviously not applicable to Rule 804(b)(5)
evaluation),4 1 whether the declarant has recanted or reaffirmed
the statement,4 2 and the existence of corroborating physical evi-
dence.4 3 In child sexual abuse cases, courts should also consider
whether the child's statement discloses an embarrassing event
that a child would not normally relate unless true, is a cry for
help, employs appropriate childlike language, or describes a
sexual act beyond a child's normal experience. 44 Also relevant
39. Compare State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) ("[lIt
is highly unlikely that a child will persist in lying to his or her parents, or
other figures of authority about sexual abuse.") with State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.
2d 165, 176, 691 P.2d 197, 205 (1984) ("[The mothers'] relationship to their chil-
dren is understandably of a character which makes their objectivity questiona-
ble.").
The problem of suggestiveness by an authority figure, particularly a
mother involved in a custody dispute, should not be underestimated. A child's
complaint of sexual abuse might have resulted from a desire to please, from
fear, or from uncritical acceptance of what the child thinks the authority fig-
ure believes has happened. Very young children especially might over time ac-
cept the suggested event as true and recall it as if it had really occurred. See
Dorschner, supra note 27, at 11-13 (describing questionable accusations as
"'epidemic"' and quoting Dianne Schetky, a child psychiatrist in Connecticut,
as stating about false accusations: "A child can be very impressionable. They
want to believe their parents. And if Mommy says Daddy abused you ... the
child is not per se lying. He is brainwashed.... Children are very suggestible.
I have seen interviews where the interrogators put words in the child's
mouth.").
40. See, e.g., Barlow, 693 F.2d at 962 (evaluating credibility of declarant
who was given immunity from prosecution to testify).
41. See supra note 33.
42. See, e.g., Barlow, 693 F.2d at 962.
43. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE § 324.1, at 908-09 (3d ed.
1984).
44. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985)
("[C]hildren do not have enough knowledge about sexual matters to lie about
them."). See generally Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's
New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 827 (1983). Courts should hold
a hearing on the issue of reliability before admitting the statement:
[Tihe court should thoroughly question the person who will testify
concerning the child's out-of-court statement, any other persons who
heard the statement, any persons who have knowledge of the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged sexual assault, and, if possible, the
child. During the questioning, the court should attempt to determine:
(1) the time lapse between the alleged sexual act and the child's reci-
tal of the statement; (2) whether the statement was made in response
to a leading question; (3) whether either the child or the hearsay wit-
ness has any bias against the defendant or any motive for fabricating
[Vol. 72:523
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are the child's age and maturity, the nature and duration of the
sexual contact, the child's physical and mental condition when
the statement was made, and the relationship of the child and
the accused.45
The residual exceptions also require a need for introduc-
tion of the hearsay statement.46 The statement must be more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
reasonably procurable evidence.47 The reasonableness of pro-
curing alternative proof depends on the fact at issue considered
in light of its posture in the total litigation.48 If the child testi-
fies fully at trial about the relevant events, introduction of the
hearsay statement may not be necessary.49
the statement or implicating the accused; (4) whether the statement
was made while the child was still upset or in pain because of the inci-
dent; (5) whether the terminology of the statement was likely to have
been used by a child the age of the alleged victim; and (6) whether
any event that occurred between the time of the alleged act and the
time the statement was made could have accounted for the contents
of the statement.
Id.
45. Myatt, 237 Kan. at 25, 697 P.2d at 843. Courts should determine relia-
bility and trustworthiness on a case-by-case basis:
Such factors as the age of the child; his or her physical and mental
condition; the circumstances of the alleged event; the language used
by the child; the presence of corroborative physical evidence; the rela-
tionship of the accused to the child; the child's family, school, and
peer relationships; [and] any motive to falsify or distort the event...
can be examined.
Id.
46. FED. R. EvID. 803(24)(B), 804(b)(5)(B).
47. Id.
48. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 803.24, at 924-25.
49. The residual exceptions also require that the statement be offered as
evidence of a material fact. FED. R. EvID. 803(24)(A), 804(b)(5)(A). This re-
quirement probably means that the fact the statement is offered to prove must
be both relevant and substantially important to the outcome of the litigation.
See FED. R. EVID. 401; Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 294 & n.13 (7th
Cir. 1979).
The residual exceptions further require that admission of the statement
serve the interests of justice and the general purposes of the Rules of Evi-
dence. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5)(C). This requirement, however, has
little practical importance in determining admissibility of hearsay statements.
See Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, 11 TEx. TECH. L. Rzv. 587, 595 (1980) (noting requirement that the inter-
ests of justice be served has not been a recurring justification for exclusion in
the caselaw).
Finally, the residual exceptions require that the proponent of the hearsay
evidence provide fair notice to the adverse party. FED. R. EVID. 803(24),
804(b)(5). Courts generally enforce the notice requirement before trial but
dispense with it if admission would apparently not prejudice the opponent and
the need for admission arises on the eve of or during the course of trial. See
1988]
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2. Special Statutory Hearsay Exceptions
Alice's statements may also be admissible if the state has a
statute allowing admission of child victim hearsay statements
under certain circumstances. At least twenty states have en-
acted hearsay exception statutes applicable in prosecutions for
child sexual abuse.50 These statutes permit admissibility of
child victims' hearsay statements when the equivalent circum-
generally Yasser, supra, at 595-97, 601-03 (discussing split in caselaw regarding
rigid enforcement of the advance notice requirement). Courts may avoid prej-
udice by granting the opponent a continuance to prepare to meet or contest
the introduction of the hearsay statement. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey,
581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding three-day recess met the purpose of
the advance notice requirement, even though pretrial notice had not been
given).
50. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1987) (requiring that circumstances of
the statement indicate its reliability); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1987)
(requiring that time, content, and circumstances of statement provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001: Rule 803(25) (1985) (re-
quiring that statement possess a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness);
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1987) (requiring no significant inconsis-
tencies between defendant's confession and child's statement that would
render the statement unreliable); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1986) (requir-
ing that time, content, and circumstances of the statement indicate its reliabil-
ity); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring that time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1987) (requiring that time, content, and cir-
cumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (no express requirement of reliabil-
ity); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1987) (requiring that time, con-
tent, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indications of
reliability); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986) (requiring that child be
apparently reliable); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1987) (no
express requirement of reliability); MINN. STAT. §§ 260.156, 595.02(3) (1986)
(requiring that circumstances of the statement and reliability of the listener
provide sufficient indicia of reliability); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp.
1987) (requiring that time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075
(Vernon 1987) (requiring that time, content, and circumstances provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1987) (re-
quiring that time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient guarantees of reliability); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5986 (Purdon
1987) (requiring that time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient guarantees of reliability); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-38
(1987) (requiring that time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient guarantees of reliability); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (requiring that statement is reliable based on time,
content, and circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1987) (requiring that
age and maturity of child, nature and duration of abuse, relationship of child
to abuser, and reliability of child indicate that justice will be best served by
admission); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987) (requiring that
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient guaran-
tees of reliability).
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stantial guarantees of trustworthiness required by Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5) (sometimes referred to as indicia of relia-
bility) are present.51 Accordingly, under these statutory hear-
say exceptions, hearsay statements need not fall under a
traditional hearsay exception to be admissible; they only need
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent
to those possessed by hearsay statements admissible under
traditional hearsay exceptions.
Although state statutes differ in the procedures they estab-
lish for determining the admissibility of child testimony,5 2 they
generally require an ad hoc determination that the nontestify-
ing child's statement possesses the particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness required under the confrontation clause,5 3 an
issue that turns on the facts of the case.1 Courts base their ad
hoc assessment on the totality of the surrounding circum-
stances, including corroborating facts such as physical evidence,
inconsistent facts, and the assessed credibility of the declarant,
all considered in the light of the traditional, firmly rooted ex-
51. For cases in which courts held admissible child hearsay statements
under such statutes, see People ex rel. K.L.M. v. Marshall, 146 IM. App. 3d 489,
493-97, 496 N.E.2d 1262, 1265-68 (1986) (statement admissible under ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, 704-6-(4)(C) (1983)); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Utah
1986) (statement admissible under Utah statutory hearsay exception); State v.
Hancock, 46 Wash. App. 672, 675-79, 731 P.2d 1133, 1135-37 (1987) (statement
admissible under WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1987)); State v. Ramirez,
46 Wash. App. 223, 229-32, 730 P.2d 98, 101-03 (1986) (statement admissible
under special hearsay exception).
52. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987)
(making admissible in civil or criminal proceedings statements showing suffi-
cient reliability when child is unavailable and other corroborative evidence ex-
ists or when child testifies and requiring in criminal cases notice to defendant
of use of statement) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd) (Supp. 1986) (making
admissible, in criminal proceedings or a proceeding to determine whether
child is in need of care, "apparently reliable" statements when the child is un-
available and was not "induced to make the statement falsely by use of threats
or promises") and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987) (making
admissible in criminal and dependency proceedings statements showing suffi-
cient indicia of reliability when child is unavailable and corroborative evidence
of the act exists or child testifies).
Kansas also enacted a hearsay exception, applicable in civil and criminal
proceedings, that permits a party to introduce, subject to satisfaction of speci-
fied requirements indicative of trustworthiness, statements of an unavailable
declarant that relate to a recently perceived event or condition. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60.460(d) (Supp. 1986).
53. The "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" notion for admissi-
bility first appeared in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), discussed infra
notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
54. For criteria used in determining admissibility, see supra notes 35-45
and accompanying text.
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ceptions to the hearsay rule. Particularly important in assess-
ing the trustworthiness of a young child's hearsay statement
are some of the same factors examined under the residual ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule that reduce the likelihood of
fabrication.55
State v. Ryan 56 illustrates the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton's search for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
In Ryan two children, when questioned about the source of
candy in their possession, first told one story to their respective
mothers then later recanted the story and stated that the de-
fendant had given it to them for permitting sexual contact.5 7 In
reversing the trial court's admission of the hearsay state-
ments,58 the court considered it important that both children
initially made the statements to only one person.59 The fact
that both mothers solicited the statements after learning that
sexual contact possibly had occurred also strongly influenced
the court.60 Implicit in the court's reasoning is the belief that
children are susceptible to suggestion from loved ones or au-
thority figures.61
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The Washington statutory
hearsay exception for child abuse prosecutions, in its search for particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, requires consideration of the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120
(Supp. 1987). The Kansas statute demands consideration of whether the state-
ment was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently
perceived, whether the statement was made in good faith prior to the com-
mencement of the action, and whether the statement was made with no incen-
tive to falsify or distort. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(d) (Supp. 1986).
Another Kansas statute requires that the court consider whether the child was
induced by threats or promises to falsely make the statement. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60.460(dd) (Supp. 1986). The Florida statute mandates consideration of
the mental and physical age and maturity of the child. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.803(23) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
56. 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
57. Id. at 168-69, 691 P.2d at 201.
58. Id. at 177, 691 P.2d at 206.
59. Id. at 176, 691 P.2d at 205.
60. Id.
61. The Ryan court said:
Applying the Parris factors to the circumstances of the present
case, the statements cannot be deemed sufficiently trustworthy to de-
prive the defendant of his right of confrontation. First, there was a
motive to lie, and each child initially told a different version of the
source of the candy they were not supposed to have. Second, all the
record reveals about the character of the children is the parties' stipu-
lation that the children were incompetent witnesses due to their
tender years. Third, the initial statements of the children were made
to one person, although subsequent repetitions were heard by others.
Fourth, the statements were not made spontaneously, but in response
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Under special statutory hearsay exceptions, proponents
often succeed in introducing a child's initial statement describ-
ing the sexual contact as well as additional statements made
immediately after the initial statement. They are less success-
ful, however, in introducing a child's statement to a police of-
ficer, social worker,6 2 or anyone else specially trained to
interview children because courts do not usually find that such
statements possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The normal timing of interviews, their inves-
tigative function, the frequent use of suggestive questions by a
person in authority, and the existence of earlier statements by
the child relating to the sexual contact all militate against ad-
missibility. As a result Alice's first statement to her mother
and any statements to Alice's examining doctor not otherwise
admissible under Rule 803(4) would be admissible under the
special statutory exceptions. In contrast, neither the statement
to the child sexual abuse task force member nor the videotaped
statement taken by the police officer three weeks before trial
should qualify under the special statutory hearsay exceptions
because of their lack of circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
C. Ex PARTE VIDEOTAPED STATEMENTS
Alice's statements to the child sexual abuse task force
member and the police officer three weeks before trial might
be admissible if the state has a statute providing for admissibil-
ity of videotaped statements. Texas, for example, in an attempt
to relieve the trauma or emotional distress that a child witness
faces in testifying against the accused in open court, enacted a
statute, subsequently held unconstitutional, 63 providing for ex
parte videotaping of the child victim's statement and for admis-
sibility of the videotaped statement in court as an exception to
to questioning. Fifth, as regards timing, both mothers had been told
of the strong likelihood that the defendant had committed indecent
liberties upon their children before the mothers questioned their chil-
dren. They were arguably predisposed to confirm what they had been
told. Their relationship to their children is understandably of a char-
acter which makes their objectivity questionable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
62. But see United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 1987)
(hearsay statement made to social worker by child admissible).
63. See Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 56
U.S.L.W. 2031, 2031 (Tex. Sup. Ct. July 1, 1987) (No. 867-85) (en banc) (state
petitioning for discretionary review, opinion subject to revision or withdrawal
from permanent law report).
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the hearsay rule.64 The statute required, however, that the
child be made available for the defendant to call and examine
and presumably cross-examine if the defendant chose to do
so. 65 The Texas statute apparently assumed that the availabil-
ity of the hearsay declarant to be called and examined by the
accused at trial satisfies the right of confrontation.
The Texas statute raised many concerns, the most impor-
tant of which is its almost certain unconstitutionality under the
confrontation clause.66 This Article returns to the Texas stat-
ute and other similar, recently enacted statutes after discussing
the Supreme Court decisions concerning the confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule.
64. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987), held
unconstitutional by Long, 694 S.W.2d at 193. The statute provided:
Sec. 2. (a) The recording of an oral statement of the child made
before the proceeding begins is admissible into evidence if:
(1) no attorney for either party was present when the statement
was made;
(2) the recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on film
or videotape or by other electronic means;
(3) the recording equipment was capable of making an accurate
recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the re-
cording is accurate and has not been altered;
(4) the statement was not made in response to questioning cal-
culated to lead the child to make a particular statement;
(5) every voice on the recording is identified;
(6) the person conducting the interview of the child in the re-
cording is present at the proceeding and available to testify or be
cross-examined by either party;
(7) the defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded
an opportunity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence;
and
(8) the child is available to testify.
(b) If the electronic recording of the oral statement of a child is
admitted into evidence under this section, either party may call the
child to testify, and the opposing party may cross-examine the child.
Id.
65. Id. The prosecution need not call the child during its case in chief. Id.
66. In Long, 649 S.W.2d at 193, the Texas Court of Appeals held that TEx.
CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987) was unconstitu-
tional. See infra notes 314-27 and accompanying text. Several recent law re-
view articles explore the confrontation clause implications of the videotape
statutes for child sexual abuse prosecutions. See Comment, Article 38.071 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure: A Legislative Response to the Needs of
Children in the Courtroom, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 279, 311-18 (1986); Note, Does
the Child Witness Videotape Statute Violate the Confrontation Clause?: Arti-
cle 38.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 17 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 1669, 1681-
85 (1986); Note, Televised Testimony vs. the Confrontation Clause... The Use
of Videotapes in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 Hous. L. REv. 1215,
1234-39 (1986). These articles, however, are incomplete because they do not
discuss the recent case of United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), discussed
infra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: CURRENT
INTERPRETATION
Even if Alice's out-of-court statements satisfy a hearsay ex-
ception, they are inadmissible in a criminal prosecution against
Sam unless they satisfy confrontation clause67 requirements as
well. The sixth amendment right to confront adverse witnesses
is not absolute. If the right were absolute, it would preclude
admission of all out-of-court statements made by an unavailable
witness, even if the statements met the requirements of a hear-
say exception. Instead, the confrontation clause permits the ad-
mission of hearsay statements depending on the availability of
the declarant and the reliability of the statement. The availa-
bility analysis questions whether the declarant testifies in
court, is available but does not testify, or is unavailable. The
reliability analysis is required when the declarant does not tes-
tify in court about the subject matter of the hearsay statement.
These two factors, availability and reliability, are discussed in
turn.
A. AvAIABiLrrY OF DECLARANT
1. Testifying Witness
To be a testifying witness under availability analysis, a wit-
ness must actually testify at trial concerning the witnessed
event. If a witness claims not to recall, asserts a privilege, or is
unable or unwilling to testify, the witness is in fact unavailable
and considered nontestifying.68 Testifying witness analysis
therefore concentrates on whether the testimony is consistent
or inconsistent with prior out-of-court statements.
a. Prior Inconsistent Statements
Out-of-court statements are generally not admissible as
substantive evidence unless they meet the requirements of a
traditional hearsay exception 69 or a residual hearsay excep-
tion.70 If the out-of-court statements are also prior inconsistent
statements, however, they may nevertheless be admissible
under the nonhearsay exemption for prior inconsistent state-
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
68. See FED. R. EviD. 804(a); infra note 173 and accompanying text.
69. The traditional hearsay exceptions are codified in FED. R. EVID.
803(1)-(23) and 804(b)(1)-(4).
70. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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ments71 or the hearsay exception provided in some jurisdictions
for prior inconsistent statements.72
If a witness testifies inconsistently with a prior out-of-court
statement, the prosecution may seek to introduce the prior
statement not only to impeach the witness but also as substan-
tive evidence. The prosecution may use the hearsay exemption
for prior inconsistent statements in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to do so, but only when the statement was made under
oath in a trial, hearing, deposition, or other proceeding.73 Cali-
fornia's rules of evidence, however, are more relaxed. Section
1235 of California's Evidence Code provides for the substantive
admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements of a testifying
declarant provided the declarant has an opportunity at trial to
admit, deny, or explain the statements. 74
Even if admissible under evidentiary rules, however, prior
inconsistent statements still face confrontation clause scrutiny.
In California v. Green75 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the application of the confrontation clause to the admis-
sibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
under section 1235 of the California Evidence Code.76 In Green
John Green was convicted of supplying marijuana to Melvin
Porter, a minor.77 Porter identified Green as his supplier at the
preliminary hearing and in an oral, unsworn statement to a po-
lice officer. 78 At trial, however, Porter was evasive and uncoop-
erative.79 He claimed that he could not recall who supplied him
with marijuana because he was under the influence of LSD at
the time of the transaction.8 0 The trial court admitted both
prior statements under section 1235 of the California Evidence
71. Under the exemption for prior inconsistent statements, a statement is
defined as not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) in-
consistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceed-
ing, or in a deposition.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
72. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West Supp. 1987).
73. See supra note 71.
74. § 1235.
75. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. 399 U.S. at 151-53.
78. Id. at 151.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 152.
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Code.8 1 The California Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of
the defendant's conviction by the district court on appeal on the
ground that admission of the prior statement as substantive evi-
dence violated his right of confrontation. 2 The United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment, upholding the constitu-
tional validity of section 1235.83
The Court in Green identified three purposes of confronta-
tion: to insure that declarants give their statements under oath,
to provide an opportunity for cross-examination, and to allow
the jury to assess the declarant's demeanor.84 Even though
none of these protections was available at the time the declar-
ant made the out-of-court statement, the Court nevertheless
found that each of the purposes of confrontation was satisfied
when the declarant testified concerning the statement at trial
and admission of the prior inconsistent statement would there-
fore not violate the confrontation clause.85 Moreover, the
Court concluded that "the inability to cross-examine the wit-
ness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be
shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is
assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of
trial.,,86
The Court in Green expressly declined to decide whether
Porter's prior statement to the police officer was admissible be-
cause at trial Porter claimed a lack of recollection of the under-
lying event.87 This raised the issue of whether the defendant
was "assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time
of trial."8 " Expressing its reluctance to decide the issue without
the state court's opinion, the Court remanded for a factual con-
clusion as to whether the declarant's lack of recollection pre-
cluded full and effective cross-examination at trial.89
81. Id.
82. Id. at 153.
83. Id. at 170.
84. Id. at 156.
85. Id. at 158-60.
86. Id. at 159. The witness in Green admitted making the prior inconsis-
tent statements. Id. at 152. In Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause is satisfied with respect to a
prior inconsistent statement if the witness has recollection and is subject to
cross-examination, even if the witness denies at trial making the prior state-
ment. Id. at 629-30.
87. 399 U.S. at 168-70.
88. Id. at 169; see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. 399 U.S. at 168-70. For a discussion of the question that was reserved
in Green, see M. GRAHAM, WrrNESS INTIMIDATION: THE LAw'S RESPONSE 143-
49 (1985).
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b. Prior Consistent Statements
The Green holding, approving the admissibility of prior in-
consistent statements, applies to prior consistent statements as
well, provided the declarant is available for cross-examination.
Although admissibility of a declarant's prior consistent state-
ments would not violate the confrontation clause, evidentiary
rules nevertheless present obstacles to the statements' admissi-
bility. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior consistent
statements are admissible only when offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive.90 The express or
implied charge usually arises during cross-examination. It can
also arise during the opponent's case in chief. In either event,
the rules provide only a limited window of admissibility for
prior consistent statements.
The common law doctrine of prompt complaint 91 affords
prior consistent statements an alternative avenue of admissibil-
ity not available under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
prompt complaint doctrine provides that when a testifying com-
plainant accuses someone of a sexual offense, the fact that the
complainant promptly complained of the occurrence is admissi-
ble when the declarant or someone who heard the complaining
statement testifies to it. The statement of prompt complaint is
admitted to corroborate the in-court testimony of the complain-
ant under the theory that the evidence of prompt complaint re-
buts the inference of fabrication that a jury might otherwise
draw from a failure to promptly complain.9 2 Admissibility of a
prompt complaint is limited to the fact of the complaint and
does not extend to a description of the incident or the name of
the offender.93
In sum, if a declarant testifies at trial, prior inconsistent
statements are admissible as substantive evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence if given under oath at a formal pro-
ceeding or under California's evidentiary rules if the declarant
merely testifies at trial concerning the statements. Further,
under Green, admissibility of prior inconsistent statements does
not violate the confrontation clause as long as the declarant tes-
90. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
91. See generally Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doc-
trine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 489, 489-92
(1983).
92. Id. at 492-93.
93. Graham, supra note 91, at 493.
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tifies at trial. Prior consistent statements likewise do not vio-
late the confrontation clause under Green, but they are less
likely to be admissible under the hearsay rule and its
exceptions.
2. Available But Nontestifying Witness
If a declarant is available but does not testify at trial, fur-
ther confrontation clause analysis is necessary. Six months af-
ter Green, in Dutton v. Evans,94 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant's right of confrontation was not violated when the
trial court admitted, under a Georgia co-conspirator hearsay ex-
ception, an out-of-court declaration of a nontestifying but avail-
able witness.95 In Evans three men, Truett, Williams, and
Evans, were charged with the murder of three police officers.
The prosecution granted Truett immunity in return for his tes-
timony.96 Williams and Evans were indicted for the murders
and tried separately.97 At Evans's trial Truett's testimony was
the most damaging of the prosecution's evidence. Truett testi-
fied that he, Williams, and Evans were stealing a car when
three police officers confronted them; they seized a gun from
one of the officers and used it to murder all three.98 One of
Williams's fellow prisoners, a man named Shaw, also testified.
Shaw said that when Williams returned to the cell after ar-
raignment, Shaw asked Williams how he had fared in court.99
According to Shaw, Williams responded, "If it hadn't been for
that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this
now. '100 Although Williams was available to either side, he
was not called to testify at Evans's trial. Defense counsel ob-
jected to Shaw's testimony on the grounds that it was hearsay
and that it violated Evans's right of confrontation.10
The trial court admitted the testimony pursuant to the
Georgia statutory co-conspirator hearsay exception'0 2 and over-
ruled the confrontation clause objection.103 Defense counsel
then cross-examined Shaw at length. Evans was convicted and
94. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 88.
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 77-78.
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-5 (1982).
103. Evans, 400 U.S. at 78.
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ultimately appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court.10 4
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld
Evans's conviction. Justice Stewart, writing the Court's plural-
ity opinion, began with a careful reminder that the confronta-
tion clause did not codify the common law hearsay rule and its
exceptions nor did it render all hearsay inadmissible. 0 5 Justice
Stewart indicated that the issue before the Court concerned the
"mission' ' 30 6 of the confrontation clause, which would be satis-
fied if the trier of fact had "'a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement.' "1307
In so defining the issue, Justice Stewart departed from the
Court's analysis in Green. In Green the Court focused on
whether the declarant's lack of recollection at trial "so af-
fected" the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine as to de-
prive the defendant of his right of confrontation. 0 8 In Evans
the defendant had no opportunity to even attempt cross-exami-
nation of the declarant because the declarant was physically ab-
sent from trial. According to Justice Stewart, however, the
issue in Evans was no longer the existence of an opportunity
for full and effective cross-examination, but whether the fact
finder had "'a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement.' "109
Although Justice Stewart's opinion is abstruse, he appar-
ently looked to three factors to determine whether the jury had
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court
statement. Justice Stewart considered the statement's proba-
tive impact, the certainty that the statement was made, and the
104. On direct appeal the Georgia courts upheld Evans's conviction. Id. at
76 (citing Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 407, 150 S.E.2d 240, 251 (1966)). A federal
district court denied Evans's writ of habeas corpus, id (noting the district
court's opinion is unreported), but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that ad-
mission of Shaw's testimony under the Georgia co-conspirator hearsay excep-
tion violated Evans's right of confrontation. Id. (citing 400 F.2d 826, 827, 832
(5th Cir. 1968)).
105. Id. at 80, 86 & n.17 (citing Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule,
75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966)).
106. Id. at 89.
107. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). Of course, a
hearsay statement is admissible if it is used to prove something other than the
truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415-17
(1985) (distinguishing Roberts and Evans and holding that an accomplice's con-
fession was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting defendant's
testimony that his own confession was obtained through coercion).
108. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 107.
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indicia of reliability surrounding the statement.110
With respect to probative impact, Justice Stewart noted in
an introductory remark that the evidence under consideration
was not "in any sense 'crucial' or 'devastating.' "111 Regarding
certainty that the statement was made, Justice Stewart con-
cluded that the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the
witness who reported the statement, while the witness was
under oath and in the presence of the ultimate trier of fact,
provided a sufficient guarantee of certainty that the statement
was made.112 Finally, addressing the reliability of the state-
ment, Justice Stewart found that Williams's statement pos-
sessed those indicia of reliability "widely viewed as
determinative" of whether a statement should be placed before
the jury without confrontation of the declarant.113 The state-
ment, containing no express assertion of past fact, "carried on
its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement un-
due weight." 14 Williams had well-established personal knowl-
edge of the facts surrounding the murder. It was unlikely that
Williams had faulty recollection of the crime. The circum-
stances under which Williams made the statement negated any
motive to misrepresent. Although in Green 'the Court had
quoted Wigmore's characterization of cross-examination as the
"'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
110. Evans, 400 U.S. at 88-89. Justice Stewart wrote:
First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact,
and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against
giving the statement undue weight. Second, Williams' personal
knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the
triple murder is abundantly established by Truett's testimony and by
Williams' prior conviction. It is inconceivable that cross-examination
could have shown that Williams was not in a position to know
whether or not Evans was involved in the murder. Third, the possi-
bility that Williams' statement was founded on faulty recollection is
remote in the extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under which Wil-
liams made the statement were such as to give reason to suppose that
Williams did not misrepresent Evans' involvement in the crime.
These circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams had no ap-
parent reason to lie to Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it
was against his penal interest to make it. These are indicia of reliabil-
ity which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a
statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confronta-
tion of the declarant.
Id.
111. Id. at 87.
112. Id. at 88.
113. Id. at 89.
114. Id. at 88.
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truth,'"115 in Evans Justice Stewart summarily dismissed as
"wholly unreal"116 the possibility that cross-examination of
Williams would have aided the jury in determining whether his
statement might have been untrustworthy.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Evans is exception-
ally unclear concerning the standard a court should apply to de-
termine the constitutional admissibility of an out-of-court
statement of an available but nontestifying declarant.
Although Justice Stewart looked to three factors-probative-
ness, certainty, and reliability-1 7 -to determine whether the
trier of fact had a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement, he failed to advise lower courts how to
properly weigh each factor. For example, it is not clear
whether Justice Stewart, by noting that the challenged state-
ment was neither crucial nor devastating, intended 'that the in-
cremental probative value of the evidence and its importance to
the litigation should be independently evaluated in the confron-
tation analysis, or whether he merely meant that any error in
admitting Williams's statement was harmless. Moreover, even
115. 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLAls
AT COMMON LAw § 1367 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)).
116. 400 U.S. at 89.
117. The various tests of Evans for determining the presence of adequate
guarantees of trustworthiness were summarized in Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923,
931 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on rehearing, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975), as follows:
(1) Does the trier of fact have "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement"? (2) How "real" is the possibility that
cross examination "could conceivably have shown the jury that the
statement, though made, might have been unreliable"? (3) What "in-
dicia of reliability" were present to permit the testimony to be placed
before the jury although there was no confrontation of the declarant?
Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329,
1339 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982), in which the court summa-
rized the reliability factors discussed in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 88-91, and
United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981), as follows:
(1) whether the declaration contained assertions of past fact; (2)
whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and
role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it was possible that
the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) whether
the circumstances under which the statements were made provided
reason to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defend-
ant's involvement in the crime. The reliability factors discussed in
Dutton, however, are not to be considered exhaustive, nor are all fac-
tors required to be present in order to admit the declarations. An ad-
ditional factor, sometimes discussed and its relevance debated, is
whether the testimony of the coconspirator was "crucial" or
"devastating."
Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1339 (citations omitted).
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if Justice Stewart intended incremental probative value to be a
relevant criterion, his opinion does not indicate whether all
crucial hearsay statements must be excluded or may be admit-
ted if indicia of reliability are adequately established.
In Ohio v. Roberts,118 a case involving the admissibility of
former testimony of an unavailable declarant, the Court in
dicta addressed questions left open in Evans concerning the ad-
missibility of a hearsay statement of an available but nontesti-
fying declarant. In Roberts the defendant was charged with
forgery of a check in Bernard Isaacs's name and with posses-
sion of stolen credit cards belonging to Isaacs and his wife.119
At a preliminary hearing, defense counsel called Isaacs's daugh-.
ter, Anita, to establish that she had permitted the defendant to
use her apartment and to attempt to elicit her admission that
she had given the defendant the checks and the credit cards
without informing him that she did not have permission to use
them.120 Anita denied giving the defendant the items.l21 In
preparation for trial, the government issued five subpoenas to
Anita for four different trial dates. 12 2 She was not at her resi-
dence and did not appear at the trial.123
At trial the defendant testified that Anita had given him
her parents' checks and credit cards.324 On rebuttal the state
offered the preliminary hearing transcript of Anita's testi-
mony,125 relying on an Ohio rule of evidence permitting a party
to use the preliminary examination testimony of a witness who
"cannot for any reason be produced at the trial."'1 26 The court
received the preliminary hearing testimony into evidence.127
Defendant was convicted'28 and ultimately appealed the deci-
sion to the Supreme Court. 29
118. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
119. Id. at 58.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 59.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Anderson 1987). The trial court de-
termined at a voir dire hearing that Anita was unavailable because no one
knew her whereabouts. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59-60.
127. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60.
128. Id.
129. The defendant in Roberts first appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals,
which reversed the conviction and held that the state had made insufficient
efforts to find Anita. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on a
different ground concluding that the trial court reasonably could have inferred
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The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and found the
preliminary hearing testimony admissible.130 The Court rea-
soned that the confrontation clause establishes a preference for
a face-to-face confrontation with respect to former testimony.131
Thus, the prosecution must produce the declarant or establish
the declarant's unavailability. 32 Moreover, the Roberts Court
held that every hearsay statement of either an available or un-
available witness, whether or not crucial or devastating to the
case, must possess indicia of reliability to be admitted.133 The
Court reaffirmed the conclusion in Green that prior consistent
and inconsistent statements of a witness testifying at trial pos-
sess the necessary indicia of reliability, because the declarant is
under oath, testifying before the trier of fact, and subject to
cross-examination. 34
The Court noted that although in Roberts the trial court at
the preliminary hearing did not declare Anita a hostile witness,
the defense counsel nevertheless explored her perception of
events and her veracity in detail.135 Thus, the Roberts Court
found that the defense counsel's method of direct examination
gave Anita's testimony the indicia of reliability necessary to sat-
isfy the confrontation clause.'3 6
The Roberts Court added confusion to confrontation clause
analysis by introducing a two-prong test in discussing the issue
of nontestifying or unavailable declarants. The Court stated:
[When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least ab-
sent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
137
from testimony at voir dire that the state had exercised due diligence in seek-
ing to procure Anita's attendance at trial. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St. 2d 191,
195, 378 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1978), rev'd, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Ohio Supreme
Court held that the transcript was inadmissible because the mere opportunity
to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford the defendant his
constitutional right of confrontation for purposes of trial. Id. at 197, 378
N.E.2d at 496.
130. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 77.
131. Id. at 63 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970)).
132. Id. at 65.
133. Id. at 65-66.
134. Id. at 73.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
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Taken literally, the Roberts Court's first prong, availability,
would mean that every hearsay statement meeting a firmly
rooted hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803, and
every statement exempt as not hearsay under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2), normally would require either production
of the declarant, or a showing of unavailability before the state-
ment would be admissible in evidence against the accused.138
Several factors, however, indicate that the Roberts Court
did not contemplate such a radical change in practice. First, the
Court interpreted the confrontation clause in the context of
discussing the former testimony hearsay exception of Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). The former testimony exception
requires unavailability both at common law139 and under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 40 The casual nature of the Court's
comment with respect to unavailability, in the context of a
hearsay exception already requiring unavailability, belied any
intention to make a radical change in the law. More impor-
tantly, in Roberts the Court clearly stated that while the con-
frontation clause normally requires a showing of unavailability,
competing interests such as "public policy and the necessities of
the case" may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.'4 '
The opinion also indicated that parties need not demonstrate
unavailability or produce the declarant when the utility of con-
138. See Reardon v. Manson, 617 F. Supp. 932, 937-39 (D. Conn. 1985), rev'd,
806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1903 (1987) (nontestifying
witness's hearsay statements inadmissible when they do not possess sufficient
indicia of reliability and the state made no effort to show the declarant's un-
availability pursuant to Roberts); People v. Kendrick, 104 IM. App. 3d 426, 430-
33, 432 N.E.2d 1054, 1058-60 (1982) (applying Roberts to find hearsay state-
ments admissible); State v. Osborne, 82 Or. App. 229, 239-40, 728 P.2d 551, 558
(1986) (co-conspirator's hearsay statements held admissible against defendant
when the declarant was unavailable and the statements had sufficient indicia
of reliability); see also United States v. Hines, 23 M.J. 125, 128-33 (C.M.A. 1986)
(military court decision applying Roberts to a sex offense case); State v. Hieb,
107 Wash. 2d 97, 111, 727 P.2d 239, 247 (1986) (en banc) (admission of child's
hearsay statement held harmless error when medical testimony pointed over-
whelmingly to guilt even though declarant's unavailability was not shown);
State v. Myren, 133 Wis. 2d 430, 440-42, 395 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986), review denied, 134 Wis. 2d 458, 401 N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1987) (admission of
accomplice's oral confession that lacked particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness and implicated defendant was harmless error).
139. See, e.g., State v. Carr, 67 S.D. 481, 483-84, 294 N.W. 174, 174-75 (1940);
State v. Ortego, 22 Wash. 2d 552, 556, 157 P.2d 320, 322 (1945) (en banc).
140. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
141. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895)).
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frontation is remote. 14 Finally, it would be completely out of
character with other Supreme Court decisions, including Evans,
to read the language of Roberts to require either unavailability
or production with respect to almost every hearsay statement
offered against a criminal defendant under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803.143
Six years later, in United States v. Inadi,144 the Supreme
Court addressed the question whether the statement in Roberts
that "the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that [the declarant] is unavailable"'145 applies to co-conspirator
hearsay statements. Inadi was charged with conspiring to man-
ufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 146 Part of the evi-
dence against him consisted of taped conversations between
various participants in the conspiracy.147 Inadi sought to ex-
clude the recorded statements of the unindicted co-conspira-
tors, including one Lazaro, on confrontation clause grounds,
contending that admissibility required a showing that the de-
clarants were unavailable. 4 The district court admitted the
statements under the hearsay co-conspirator exemption, condi-
142. Id. at 65 n.7.
143. It is interesting to note that, generally speaking, neither the state
courts, the United States Courts of Appeals, nor the leading commentators on
the Federal Rules of Evidence construed Roberts as ushering in a radical
change. For example, in United States v. Yakobov, the Second Circuit held
that evidence of the absence of a public record may be introduced against the
criminal defendant under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) without produc-
tion of the available records custodian or any other available witness. 712 F.2d
20, 27 (2d Cir. 1983). In United States v. Massa, the Eighth Circuit construed
Roberts as follows:
We read Roberts... to place the burden on the government to make
available for cross-examination a witness whose out-of-court state-
ments it is using against the defendant. The [Roberts] Court stated
"[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of . . . the exception
to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities
have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial . .. ."
Thus, it is the government's burden to obtain the available hearsay
declarant's presence at trial, although it need not call the witness to
testify.
740 F.2d 629, 640 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74) (emphasis
in original), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
144. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
145. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
146. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 388-89.
147. Id. at 390.
148. Id. Inadi also protested admission of the statements on the ground
that they did not satisfy the hearsay co-conspirator exemption of Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which exempts from the hearsay bar statements by a
co-conspirator of a party made "during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy" when offered against the party.
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tioned on the prosecution's commitment to produce Lazaro.149
The government subpoenaed Lazaro but he failed to appear,
and defense counsel made no effort to secure his presence.150
The district court overruled Inadi's renewed confrontation
clause objections. 51 Inadi appealed his conviction.152
The United States Supreme Court upheld the verdict. 53
The Court held that the confrontation clause does not always
require a showing of the hearsay declarant's unavailability.
1 5
The Court noted that Roberts did not support such a require-
ment because that opinion simply reaffirmed the longstanding
rule that subjects the prior testimony of a nontestifying witness
to unavailability analysis. 55
More specifically, the Inadi Court held that the Roberts re-
quirement of declarant unavailability did not apply to co-con-
spirator statements. Co-conspirator statements derive much of
their value from having been made in a context very different
from trial and are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence
even if the declarant testifies at trial.156 Their admission into
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Inadi's conviction, hold-
ing in reliance on Roberts that although Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)
had been satisfied, the confrontation clause established an independent re-
quirement that the prosecution, as a condition to admission of any out-of-court
statements, must show the declarant's unavailability. United States v. Inadi,
748 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
153. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 394; see United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 1958 (1987) (holding that according to Inadi unavailabil-
ity is no longer a prerequisite to admissibility).
156. The Inadi Court noted:
Because [co-conspirator statements] are made while the conspiracy is
in progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's con-
text that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the
same matters in court. When the Government--as here-offers the
statement of one drug dealer to another in furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy, the statement often will derive its significance from the
circumstances in which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak
differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their illegal
aims than when testifying on the witness stand. Even when the de-
clarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce
a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during
the course of the conspiracy.
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have changed
substantially between the time of the statements and the trial. The
declarant and the defendant will have changed from partners in an il-
legal conspiracy to suspects or defendants in a criminal trial, each
with information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant
19881
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evidence furthers the confrontation clause's mission of advanc-
ing the "'truth-determining process.' "157
In addition, the Court concluded that an unavailability rule
would accomplish little.158 Under such a rule, the co-conspira-
tor statements would be admissible if the declarants are either
unavailable or produced by the prosecution. 5 9 Moreover, an
unavailability rule is unlikely "to produce much testimony that
adds anything to the 'truth-determining process' over and above
what would be produced without such a rule"'160 because pre-
sumably only those declarants that neither side believes will be
particularly helpful will not have been subpoenaed as
witnesses.161
The Court further noted that in contrast to the slight bene-
fits, an unavailability rule would impose significant burdens.162
Because the co-conspirator rule is the most frequently used
hearsay exception, adding the declarant unavailability test to
the decisions subject to appellate review "would impose a sub-
stantial burden on the entire criminal justice system."'163 Fur-
thermore, an unavailability rule would place "a significant
practical burden on the prosecution"' 64 by requiring the prose-
cution to identify all co-conspirator declarants, locate them, and
attempt to ensure their availability for trial. 65 In short, the In-
himself may be facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little
incentive to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of com-
ing to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation, it is
extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the eviden-
tiary significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operat-
ing in full force.
These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from the
statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testimony cases.
Those cases rested in part on the strong similarities between the priorjudicial proceedings and the trial. No such strong similarities exist be-
tween co-conspirator statements and live testimony at trial. To the
contrary, co-conspirator statements derive much of their value from
the fact that they are made in a context very different from trial, and
therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence.
Id. at 395-96.
157. Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985)).
158. Id. According to the Court, "the unavailability rule cannot be de-
fended as a constitutional 'better evidence' rule, because it does not actually
serve to exclude anything, unless the prosecution makes the mistake of not
producing an otherwise available witness." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see infra note 252 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 252.
162. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 398-400.
163. Id. at 399.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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adi Court concluded that considerations of reliability and ne-
cessity as well as those of benefit and burden dictate that the
confrontation clause does not mandate an initial showing of de-
clarant unavailability before a statement of a co-conspirator is
admissible.166
Although both Evans and Inadi involved the co-conspirator
hearsay exception, the Court's analysis in Inadi evinces signifi-
cant theoretical development over the intervening sixteen
years. Evans is a confused opinion focusing on reliability of the
hearsay statement, not on production of an available declarant.
The Evans Court combined assessments of reliability and ne-
cessity with benefit and burden to conclude that an obviously
reliable statement that is not "crucial" or "devastating" is ad-
missible despite the absence of an available declarant 67 The
Court in Evans used language one expects in a harmless error
opinion.
The Inadi opinion, however, shares none of the Evans
opinion's harmless error ring. The Inadi decision includes no
discussion of the cumulative nature of the challenged statement
or its otherwise unimportant nature in the case. In fact, the In-
adi Court explicitly and implicitly recognized that co-conspira-
tor hearsay statements meeting the requirements of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) co-conspirator exemp-
tion are highly probative and critical in the prosecution of
many cases.' 68
Moreover, the Inadi Court addressed reliability and neces-
sity, as well as benefit and burden, in the context of deciding
166. The Incdi Court concluded:
An unavailability rule would impose all of these burdens even if
neither the prosecution nor the defense wished to examine the declar-
ant at trial. Any marginal protection to the defendant by forcing the
government to call as witnesses those co-conspirator declarants who
are available, willing to testify, hostile to the defense and yet not al-
ready subpoenaed by the prosecution, when the defendant himself can
call and cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavailabil-
ity rule. We hold today that the Confrontation Clause does not em-
body such a rule.
Id. at 399-400.
The Court in Inadi also suggested that the right of the accused to produce
an available out-of-court declarant to testify under the compulsory process
clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, is relevant to determining under the confronta-
tion clause whether the prosecution in the first instance must produce the de-
clarant. 475 U.S. at 397. This is especially troubling and is discussed further in
connection with the application of the Texas videotaping statute for victims of
child sexual abuse. See infra text accompanying notes 330-38.
167. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
168. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396-400.
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whether the confrontation clause requires the production of an
available declarant,16 9 not in the context of determining
whether a hearsay statement of a declarant not called to testify
at trial, available or not, is sufficiently trustworthy to be admis-
sible. Whereas the Evans Court used the Roberts Court's indi-
cia of reliability requirement to determine whether a hearsay
statement of a nontestifying declarant was sufficiently trust-
worthy to pass constitutional muster,170 the Inadi Court used
the same requirement to decide whether an available declarant
must be called to satisfy the confrontation clause.' 71 It is ques-
tionable whether reliability should be the cornerstone of deter-
mining whether unavailability must be shown when reliability
under Roberts is an independent requirement imposed by the
confrontation clause whenever the declarant does not testify. 72
3. Unavailable Declarant
Under Roberts, admissible hearsay statements of unavaila-
ble declarants satisfy the confrontation clause if they possess
adequate indicia of reliability. 73 In determining unavailability,
the important factor is the availability of the declarant's testi-
mony, not the declarant's physical presence in court. A wit-
ness's testimony may be unavailable at trial for many reasons,
most important among them incompetence, the Federal Rules
of Evidence grounds for unavailability, the danger of severe
psychological injury to a child victim from testifying, and an
unwillingness or inability to testify.
a. Incompetency
All witnesses, including child witnesses, must be competent
before they may testify.174 Rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Ev-
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
171. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392-96.
172. It is not surprising that the single notion of indicia of reliability is
hard pressed to fulfill two functions simultaneously. If reliability, however, is
not the appropriate test for requiring unavailability, what is? See infra notes
351-94 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
174. FED. R. EVID. 601. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 eliminated all
grounds of witness incompetency with respect to a charge, claim, or defense as
to which federal law provides the rule of decision, except those specifically
recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The following characteristics are
not grounds of incompetency: age, religious belief, mental incapacity, color of
skin, moral incapacity, conviction of a crime, marital relationship, and connec-
tion with the litigation as a party, attorney, or interested person. See FED. R.
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idence requires that witnesses declare that they will testify
truthfully by oath or affirmation, 175 and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 602 requires that witnesses possess personal knowledge
of the witnessed event.176 Together these rules require that
witnesses have the physical and mental capacity to understand
the duty to tell the truth, to distinguish between the truth and
a lie or fantasy,177 and to accurately perceive, record, and recol-
lect impressions of facts. In addition, witnesses must possess
the capacity of narration-the ability to comprehend questions
and express themselves understandably-with the aid of an in-
terpreter when necessary. 17 Competency requires no other
EvID. 601 advisory committee's note. Long ago regarded as grounds of incom-
petency, if such matters survive today, they do so in most instances as avenues
for impeachment of the witness. Overall, Federal Rule of Evidence 601 closely
reflects the common law.
175. FED. R. EVID. 603 states: "Before testifying, every witness shall be re-
quired to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation admin-
istered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so."
176. FED. R. EVID. 602 states:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the
matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to
the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses.
Id.
177. Recommendations have been made to permit a child to testify without
taking an oath or giving an affirmation that he or she will testify truthfully.
Contra FED. R. EVID. 603 (requiring witnesses to affirm they will testify truth-
fully). The apparent purpose of the recommendation is to avoid a judicial de-
termination of whether the child knows the difference between the truth and
a lie or fantasy. It is suggested that a witness who does not understand the
difference between the truth and a lie or fantasy or the obligation to tell the
truth should not be permitted to testify.
Attempts to eliminate taking the oath while requiring some understand-
ing by the child of the duty to tell the truth likewise are unsatisfactory. Sec-
tion 90.605(2) of the Florida Statutes, for example, states: "In the court's
discretion, a child may testify without taking the oath if the court determines
the child understands the duty to tell the truth or the duty not to lie." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.605(2) (West Supp. 1987). If the child understands the duty to
tell the truth, the child can most certainly take an oath or give an affirmation.
Moreover, the court has to decide whether the child knows the difference be-
tween the truth and a lie as part of the process of determining whether the
child understands the duty to tell the truth or not to lie. The wisdom of the
Florida statute is subject to challenge.
178. See FED. R. EvID. 604 (requiring interpreters to take an oath or affirm
that they will testify truthfully). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.606(1)(a), (b)
(West Supp. 1987), which provides:
(1)(a) When a judge determines that a witness cannot hear or under-
stand the English language, or cannot express himself in English suf-
19881
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personal qualifications.179
When the witness's capacity is questioned, the ultimate de-
termination is whether the witness is so bereft of powers of ob-
servation, recordation, recollection, and narration that a
reasonable juror cannot believe that the witness possessed per-
sonal knowledge of the event or told the truth. That test of
competency requires minimum credibility.8 0 Courts tend to re-
solve doubts about minimum credibility of a witness, including
a child witness, in favor of permitting the jury to hear the testi-
mony and judge the witness's credibility for itself.' 8 '
ficiently to be understood, an interpreter who is duly qualified to
interpret for the witness shall be sworn to do so.
(b) This section is not limited to persons who speak a language other
than English, but applies also to the language and descriptions of any
person, such as a child or person who is mentally or developmentally
disabled, who cannot be reasonably understood, or who cannot under-
stand questioning, without the aid of an interpreter.
Id.
179. The Rules specify no mental qualification. The Advisory Committee's
Note reasons that standards of mental capacity have proved elusive. FED. R.
EVID. 601 advisory committee's note. Although mental incapacity is not a spec-
ified ground of incompetency, if a witness's mental capacity has been seriously
questioned, his or her testimony may still be excluded under Federal Rule of
Evidence 602 on the ground that no reasonable juror could believe the witness
possesses personal knowledge or under Federal Rule of Evidence 603 on the
ground that no reasonable juror could believe the witness understands the dif-
ference between the truth and a lie or fantasy and understands the duty to tell
the truth.
180. 3 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 601[01] (1987). Regarding
competency and credibility, Weinstein states:
If competency is defined as the minimum standard of credibility nec-
essary to permit any reasonable man to put any credence in a wit-
ness's testimony, then a witness must be competent as to the matters
he is expected to testify about; it is the court's obligation to insure
that he meets that minimum standard. In making this determination
the court will still be deciding competency. It would, however, in
view of the way the rule is cast, probably be more accurate to say that
the court will decide not competency but minimum credibility. This
requirement of minimum credibility is just one aspect of the require-
ment of minimum probative force-i.e., relevancy. Regardless of ter-
minology, the trial judge may exclude all or a part of the witness'
testimony on the ground that no one could reasonably believe the wit-
ness could have observed, remembered, communicated or told the
truth with respect to the event in question.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
181. Kentucky v. Stincer summarizes three issues the judge is required to
resolve under Kentucky law when a child's competency to testify is raised:
"whether the child is capable of observing and recollecting facts, whether the
child is capable of narrating those facts to a court or jury, and whether the
child has a moral sense of the obligation to tell the truth." 107 S. Ct. 2658,
2664-65 (1987).
A preliminary hearing, especially with respect to children, is sometimes
[Vol. 72:523
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b. Unavailability
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides five possible
grounds of unavailability of a competent witness's testimony. 8 2
Under subsection (a)(1), a witness who is exempt from testify-
ing about the subject matter of the statement on the grounds of
privilege is unavailable. The court must allow the claim of
privilege before the witness is considered unavailable. Under
subsection (a)(2), a witness who persists in refusing to testify
concerning the subject matter of the statement despite a court
order is unavailable. Silence resulting from misplaced reliance
on a privilege without making a claim or despite a court's de-
nial of an asserted claim of privilege constitutes unavailability
under this subsection. Under subsection (a)(3), a witness who
testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of her state-
ment is unavailable. Failed memory unavailability extends not
only to witnesses who truly lack recollection but also to those
who feign lack of recollection due to, for example, an unwill-
held in chambers with only the judge, the witness, and a court reporter pres-
ent. On other occasions the attorneys for both sides are also present while the
parties are excluded. Whether the criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to be present when his lawyer is present was decided in the negative in
Stincer, id. at 2658, 2667-68.
182. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the
declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testi-
mony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, re-
fusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the pro-
curement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804, consistent with the common law, see, e.g.,
supra note 139, provides that certain hearsay statements are admissible only if
the declarant is unavailable. Regarding hearsay statements admissible solely
pursuant to such an exception, it is thus possible that the statement of an
available but nontestifying declarant would be admissible when offered by the
prosecution under the confrontation clause but not under the hearsay rule and
its exceptions.
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ingness or inability to confront the defendant face-to-face.
Under subsection (a)(4), a witness who is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or a then-existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity is unavailable. In crimi-
nal cases, if the government's witness is only temporarily un-
available, the confrontation clause may require resort to a
continuance. Finally, under subsection (a)(5), in both civil and
criminal cases, a declarant whose presence cannot be secured
by process or other reasonable means is unavailable. In crimi-
nal cases, the confrontation clause requires that the govern-
ment make a good faith effort18 3 to obtain the presence of the
witness at trial, beyond a mere showing of an inability to com-
pel appearance by subpoena, before prior testimony is admis-
sible as a substitute for testimony.
c. Severe Psychological Injury
Efforts to shield child witnesses from potential injury from
face-to-face confrontation with the defendant at trial have re-
sulted in statutes permitting the introduction of a child's testi-
mony through closed circuit television or videotaped
statements. 8 4 Those statutes generally require that the child
183. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
184. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1986) (videotaped deposition of
victims or witnesses under age 16); ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1986) (testi-
mony of witnesses or victims under age 16 by closed circuit equipment); ARiZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (West 1982) (videotaped testimony of minor wit-
nesses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1988) (videotaped preliminary
hearing testimony for victims age 15 or less); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West
Supp. 1988) (testimony of victims age 10 or under by two-way closed circuit
television); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401.3 (1986) (admissibility of videotaped
depositions for victims of child abuse); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp.
1986) (videotaped depositions of child witnesses under age 12); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1987) (videotaped deposition of child victim); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1987) (testimony of child victim through closed
circuit television); HAW. R. EvID. 616 (videotaped testimony of child victim);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1987) (testimony of child by video-
tape or closed circuit television); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1987)
(testimony of child by closed circuit television); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434
(Supp. 1986) (videotaped testimony of child victims); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (videotaped testimony of child
victim); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987) (closed circuit televi-
sion); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (videotaped or
closed circuit transmission of child witness's testimony); MINN. STAT. § 260.156
(1986) (video, audio, or other recorded statement of child victim); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1987) (child's videotaped testimony); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (Supp. 1987) (testimony of child victim by closed circuit televi-
sion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984) (videotaped depositions for victims
under 16 years of age); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 65.00-.30 (Supp. 1988) (testi-
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be unavailable to testify and establish standards of unavailabil-
ity for child witnesses.8 5 Two Florida statutes, for example,
provide that a child witness is unavailable upon the court's
finding that a substantial likelihood exists that a child victim or
witness of sexual abuse "would suffer at least moderate emo-
tional or mental distress if required to testify in open court."'18 6
A Maine statute provides that a child witness is unavailable if
the court finds "that the mental or physical well-being of that
person will more likely than not be harmed if that person were
to testify in open court. 1u8 7 A New Mexico court rule provides
for unavailability "upon a showing that the child may be unable
to testify without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary
mental or emotional harm."'L88 Finally, a California statute pro-
vides that a witness is unavailable on the ground of physical or
mental illness or infirmity if expert testimony "establishes that
physical or mental trauma resulting from an alleged crime has
caused harm to a witness of sufficient severity that the witness
is physically unable to testify or is unable to testify without suf-
fering substantial trauma."' 8 9
It is doubtful whether any of those statutory standards are
sufficient to constitute unavailability under the confrontation
clause. The confrontation clause probably requires a showing
of greater likelihood of severe psychological injury. A Florida
statute that creates a hearsay exception for statements of child
victims of sexual abuse provides for unavailability on a showing
of substantial likelihood of "severe emotional or mental
harm."'' 90 The Florida statutes permitting videotaped or closed
circuit television testimony, however, require only a substantial
likelihood of "moderate emotional or mental distress."'191 The
requirement of only moderate emotional or mental distress for
videotaped or closed circuit television testimony in comparison
with the requirement of severe emotional or mental harm for a
child victim hearsay exception is probably based on the mis-
mony of child victim by closed circuit television); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1987) (videotape of deposition or testimony at preliminary
hearing for use at trial).
185. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. But see KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3434 (Supp. 1986), discussed infra note 313.
186. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53, 92.54 (West Supp. 1987).
187. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (Supp. 1987).
188. N.M. Sup. CT. R. 10-217.
189. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1987). An expert witness is de-
fined for this purpose to include physicians, surgeons, and psychiatrists. Id.
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1987).
191. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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taken and inappropriate notion that the confrontation clause
requirement of unavailability can vary depending on the trust-
worthiness of the testimony-the more trustworthy the testi-
mony, the less strenuous the showing needed to establish
unavailability.
Witnesses who testify in open court often suffer some emo-
tional distress. Many, if not most, rape victims suffer severe
emotional distress or trauma while testifying, especially when
face-to-face with the accused. Presumably, so do many other
groups of victims. Unavailability requires more than merely
showing the possibility of emotional distress or trauma, even
more than showing a likelihood that such emotional distress or
trauma will be substantial or severe: a showing of a substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm is required.192
A California court held that to find a witness unavailable
because of emotional distress or trauma, the potential psycho-
logical injury must render the witness's appearance "'relatively
impossible.' ",193 Under the more onerous relative impossibility
standard, the court must find that the emotional distress or
trauma that the child witness is likely to suffer as a result of
testifying against the defendant in open court is significantly
more severe than the emotional distress or trauma that other
witnesses often suffer.'9 4 Applying that standard, it is ex-
192. Attorneys and psychologists, including the author, that were present
at a conference on child sexual abuse unanimously reported that a great ma-
jority of children are capable of testifying at trial without much difficulty. See,
e.g., Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, in
PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 95, 98 (Mar. 1985) (conference held in Washington, D.C.,
and sponsored by the National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection, a program of the Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar As-
sociation). Participants reported that children who initially volunteered the
report of the incident were usually able to repeat their complaint in front of
the accused at trial. Participants reported that children who had to be ques-
tioned about the sexual abuse before disclosing it, and who fluctuated in their
accounts of what transpired, were more likely to'suffer trauma and emotional
distress from face-to-face confrontation in open court. Such children were also
more likely to recant before or at trial.
193. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 518, 668 P.2d 738, 747, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 440 (1983) (quoting People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 53, 155
Cal. Rptr. 414, 420 (1979)).
194. In determining whether it is relatively impossible for the child witness
to testify on the basis of the likelihood of severe psychological injury, the court
in Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981), suggested the
following factors:
[W]e think that the following matters are relevant to the question of
psychological unavailability: (1) the probability of psychological in-
jury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree of anticipated injury, (3)
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tremely unlikely that the Maine, New Mexico, or California
statutes discussed above' 95 will survive confrontation clause
analysis. Under the Maine statute, prior recorded testimony of
a child witness becomes admissible, subject to cross-examina-
tion by the defendant, upon a finding of unavailability.196 The
California statute likewise provides for admissibility of prior
testimony, but only of preliminary hearing testimony.197 New
Mexico sanctions admissibility of videotaped depositions.198 All
three statutory schemes, however, provide that the defendant
must be present when the child testifies. 99 Only under very
unusual circumstances will the child's testimony face-to-face
with the defendant in open court be "relatively impossible"
when it is "relatively possible" for the same child to testify
the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the expected
psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the
average victim of a rape, kidnapping [child sexual abuse] or terrorist
act. Just as in the case of physical infirmity, it is difficult to state the
precise quantum of evidence required to meet the standard of unavail-
ability. The factors should be weighed in the context of each other, as
well as in the context of the nature of the crime and the pre-existing
psychological history of the witness.
Id. at 830. See also Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prose-
cutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1985), in which
the author states:
Some trauma is inevitable whenever a child takes the stand, and
although the trauma of testifying should be minimized to the extent
possible, it cannot justify depriving the defendant of a fundamental
aspect of his right to a fair trial.
. Specifically, the state holds an interest in protecting young
children, allegedly the victims of sexual abuse, from the trauma of re-
peated appearances and extended testimony in open court in the pres-
ence of the alleged assailant. The trial judge should therefore allow
the child to testify on videotape if testifying in open court would cause
the child substantial emotional trauma.
Id. at 819, 824; cf. State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 517, 326 N.W.2d 744, 751-52
(1982) (holding that courts should alter court procedure to lessen trauma of
child witnesses but should not allow child to avoid testifying because of emo-
tional trauma).
195. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
196. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(2) (Supp. 1987).
197. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (West Supp. 1987) (providing that the
court may admit a videotape of the victim's testimony at the preliminary hear-
ing as former testimony if the court finds that further testimony would cause
the victim emotional trauma, rendering the victim medically unavailable to
testify).
198. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984).
199. See supra notes 196-98. But see CAL. EvID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp.
1987) (allowing admission of statement by child witness made out of the pres-
ence of the defendant for the limited purpose of determining the admissibility
of defendant's confession).
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face-to-face with the defendant at a prior hearing, former trial,
preliminary hearing, or perpetuation deposition.200 The Florida
statutes, on the other hand, could utilize the relative impossibil-
ity standard because, unlike the other statutes, they provide for
the taking of the child's testimony outside the defendant's
presence. 201
d. Unwillingness or Inability to Testify
A child witness may be unavailable because the child is un-
willing or unable to testify in open court, whether or not in the
defendant's presence, even though the court requests that the
child testify. A child witness may also be unavailable if, placed
in unfamiliar court surroundings, the child forgets what
happened.202
B. RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY STATEMENT
The Court in California v. Green 203 held that the con-
frontation clause is satisfied whenever the declarant of a
hearsay statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination.20 4 In those circumstances a court need not search
for adequate indicia of reliability before admitting the
statement.
When the declarant does not testify at trial, however, the
confrontation clause requires the court to measure, without re-
gard to whether the witness is unavailable or available, the
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement against the indicia of
reliability standard articulated as the second prong of the test
in Ohio v. Roberts.205 Although the Court in Roberts declined
200. A deposition may be less stressful because it is not public. On the
other hand, if counsel is taking the child's deposition in a small room, and the
defendant is there, the child may have trouble looking away from the defend-
ant. The process may thus be more traumatic than testimony in open court.
201. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53(4), 92.54(4) (West Supp. 1987).
202. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 21, 647 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) ('"Te
child may be unable to testify at trial due to fading memory, retraction of ear-
lier statements due to guilt or fear, tender age, or inability to appreciate the
proceedings in which he or she is a participant."); see also FED. R. EviD.
804(a)(2), (3) (defining "unavailable" to include persistent refusal to testify
and lack of memory).
203. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
204. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
205. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Court stated:
The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability" requirement princi-
pally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such
solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the "substance of the constitutional protection."
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to map out a theory of the confrontation clause that would de-
termine the constitutionality of admissibility under all hearsay
exceptions, the Court stated, without qualification, that a trial
court may admit into evidence a hearsay statement of a nontes-
tifying witness only if the statement bears adequate indicia of
reliability.20 6 The Roberts Court concluded that adequate indi-
cia of reliability20 7 can be inferred without more in a case in
which the evidence falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception.120
The Roberts Court held that statements not falling within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception are nevertheless constitution-
ally admissible if they possess "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness '20 9 equivalent to the circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness underlying the firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions. The Court's language parallels the requirements of the
residual hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules210 and has
been adopted in special statutory hearsay exceptions in some
states for use in child sex abuse prosecutions.211 Thus, evidence
This reflects the truism that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values," and "stem
from the same roots." It also responds to the need for certainty in the
workaday world of conducting criminal trials.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-exami-
nation at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if
it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be ex-
cluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
Id. at 66 (citations and footnotes omitted).
206. Id.
207. Adequate indicia of reliability must be established with regard to
whether the witness who does not appear must also be shown to be unavaila-
ble. Id.
208. Id. Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions include the common law hear-
say exception for former testimony codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1); the hearsay exceptions specifically denominated in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 which do not require unavailability; the remaining exceptions
specifically denominated in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 which do require un-
availability (with the arguable exception of statements against penal interest),
see infra note 219; the hearsay exemption of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) defining admissions of parties-opponent as not hearsay (with the ar-
guable exception of adoptive admissions of codefendants), see infra notes 215-
17; and the once arguable exemption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(F)
defining statements of co-conspirators as not hearsay. See infra notes 224-31
and accompanying text.
209. 448 U.S. at 66.
210. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
211. The Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986), Washington,
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admissible under those hearsay exceptions also satisfies the re-
liability concerns of the confrontation clause.212 After the
Court's decision in Roberts, three areas of dispute arose con-
cerning whether a hearsay exemption or exception was firmly
rooted or required a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
1. Adoptive Admissions
Under the Federal Rules, a statement adopted by a party is
exempted as nonhearsay.213 In United States v. Monks,214 how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that adoptive ad-
missions of a co-defendant do not automatically satisfy the
confrontation clause.215 The court reasoned that although the
defendant can "confront" his own out-of-court adoptive admis-
sions by testifying at trial, other defendants incriminated by the
adoptive admissions would be deprived of the right of confron-
tation.21 6 The court therefore required a further search for re-
liability by balancing whether the statements were assertions of
past fact, whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the
facts related, whether the declarant's recollection was faulty,
and whether circumstances suggested the declarant had misrep-
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987), and Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.803(23) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987), child sex abuse statutes follow the Rob-
erts Court's language. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
212. The statement in United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983), agreed to in United States v. Marchini,
797 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1288 (1987), that "we
... assume for the purposes of this decision that a distinction does exist be-
cause we do not believe that Roberts stands for the general proposition that
evidence of reliability may be inferred under all exceptions to the rule against
hearsay, including Rule 804(b)(5)" and that the court should proceed "on a
case-by-case basis" fails to support the notion of a distinction. Of course a
case-by-case approach is called for. Neither Barlow nor Marchini, however,
provide any support for the assertion that differences exist between the case-
by-case approach called for by Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) and Roberts.
213. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(B).
214. 774 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
215. Id. at 952. The Monks Court stated:
Here, the fact that Monks has implicated Holt in the robbery, in and
of itself, incriminates Holt regardless of whether Holt adopts Monks'
implications or not. Therefore, the Confrontation Clause is implicated
because Holt is unable to cross-examine Monks as to his accusations.
We conclude that adoptive admissions do not automatically satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, at least where the third-party statements al-
leged to have been adopted have probative value independent of the
fact that they may have been adopted by the defendant.
Id. (footnote omitted).
216. Id.
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resented the defendant's role.2 17
2. Statements Against Penal Interest
Courts disagree as to whether statements against penal in-
terest, offered to inculpate or exculpate under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3), fall within the firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions of Ohio v. Roberts,218 or must have particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. 219 The Federal Rules of Evidence
require that corroborating circumstances indicate the trustwor-
thiness of exculpatory statements. 220 Some courts have applied
that requirement to inculpatory statements as well.221 The
question of whether statements against penal interest fall
within the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions or must have par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness may lack practical sig-
nificance if the requirement of corroborating circumstances is
the equivalent of the separate requirement of a showing of par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 222
3. Co-conspirator Statements
Until recently, the circuits were split as to whether state-
ments falling within the co-conspirator hearsay exemption 223
were firmly rooted and thus automatically satisfied the con-
frontation clause.22 For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of
217. Id.
218. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
219. Compare United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir.
1983) (firmly rooted), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984), with Olson v. Green,
668 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir.) (particularized guarantees), cert denied, 456 U.S.
1009 (1982). For other decisions that require a showing of particularized guar-
antees, see Maugeri v. State, 460 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 148, 654 P.2d 77, 81 (1982) (en banc).
220. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir. 1981).
222. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 279, at 824-27
(3d ed. 1984) (discussing confrontation problems encountered when determin-
ing what is against interest).
223. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
224. Admissions of a party-opponent that are exempt from the operation of
the rule against hearsay by Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) formed a possi-
ble exception because admissibility is based upon the adversary system rather
than an assessment of trustworthiness. Under Roberts it was unclear whether
statements admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), and in
particular, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), fell within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception. See United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 951-52 (3d Cir.
1985), vacated, 791 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The Caputo court com-
mented, "[i]n holding the Roberts 'unavailability' and 'reliability' requirements
fully applicable to the admissions of coconspirators who do not testify in court,
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Appeals held in United States v. Massa225 that no reason exists
"to specifically exclude coconspirator statements from Robert's
[sic] requisite showing of unavailability and reliability."226 The
court reasoned that the same interests of face-to-face confronta-
tion involved in hearsay exceptions apply to co-conspirator
statements admitted as hearsay exemptions. 227 The court fur-
ther reasoned that "coconspirator statements may be more in
need of scrutiny under the confrontation clause precisely be-
cause, unlike hearsay exceptions, they are not admissible be-
cause of their inherent reliability. '228 Thus, the Massa court
held that the Roberts Court's unavailability and particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness requirements applied to co-con-
spirator statements. 229
we are joined by the other Courts of Appeals that have deided this question."
Id. at 951. Judge Sloviter wrote a strong dissent in which he argued that Rob-
erts only applies to those hearsay exceptions that require unavailability at
common law. Id. at 953. For a full view, see United States v. Williams, 737
F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). In Williams
the court held that "challenges to co-conspirators' statements should be based
on the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), not on the Sixth Amendment." 737
F.2d at 610. See also United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir.
1984) ("The Circuits are split as to whether compliance with Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
automatically satisfies the Sixth Amendment requirements.") (emphasis in
original). The question was answered with respect to co-conspirators' state-
ments in Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987). See infra
note 230 and accompanying text.
225. 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
226. Id. at 639.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. The court in Massa excluded the co-conspirator's statement under
the confrontation clause (even though the statement was admissible under the
co-conspirator hearsay exemption) because the declarant made the statements
after the scheme was discovered and the statement's reliability could not be
assured. Id. at 40-41. See also United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614, 628 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3261 (1987), in which the court stated:
Coconspirator statements do not possess the special trustworthiness
characteristic of evidence falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception." They are instead admitted because of "the legal fiction that
each conspirator is an agent of the other and that statements of one
can therefore be attributable to all." Thus, the Confrontation Clause
requires a showing of reliability in addition to the requirements set
forth in FRE 801(d)(2)(E).
Id. (citations omitted); cf. United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir.
1986) (after acknowledging prior decisions that indicate a requirement of a
"higher standard of reliability... if the hearsay statements are 'crucial,"' and
after repeating prior statements that cases in which the requirements of the
hearsay rule alone "do not provide sufficient indicia of reliability... will be
rare," held: "We decline appellant's invitation to require more support for a
co-conspirator's statement than is required by Rule 801(d)(2)(E)."), cert de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 3261 (1987); United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 610 (7th
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In Bourjaily v. United States,2 30 however, the Supreme
Court recently took the opposite position, stating that "the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough
rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court's holding in
Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the relia-
bility of such statements." 33- Interestingly, the majority in
Bourjaily determined that the co-conspirator hearsay exception
satisfied the second prong of Roberts, not because of an assess-
ment of reliability, but because the co-conspirator exception has
a long-standing tradition.2 32 The Bourjaily Court ignored the
fact that notions of agency,2 33 the adversary system,2 34 and ne-
Cir. 1984) ("(C)hallenges to co-conspirators' statements should be based on the
requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), not on the Sixth Amendment."), cert de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
Regarding factors considered when particularized guarantees are sought,
see United States v. Matlock, 773 F.2d 227, 229 (8th Cir. 1985) (considering
whether the declarant made the statement in circumstances indicating reliabil-
ity, whether the declarant had any reason to lie when making the statement,
whether the declarant had a problem with memory, and whether the declar-
ant had personal knowledge). For a decision incorrectly applying the factors
from Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970), to determine reliability instead
of those implied in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), see United States v.
Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 839-40 (1st Cir. 1985).
Statements of a co-conspirator were held to be within the "firmly rooted"
notion in Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987). See infra
note 230 and accompanying text.
230. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
231. Id. at 2783. In an earlier case, United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986), the Court explicitly refused to address the question. Id. at 391 n.3. The
Inadi Court said reliability of the out-of-court statements was not at issue in
the case because the "Court of Appeals determined that whether or not the
statements are reliable, their admission violated the Sixth Amendment be-
cause the government did not show that the declarant was unavailable to tes-
tify." Id. (citing United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1984)).
232. Id. at 2782-83.
233. See id. at 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe [co-conspirator] ex-
emption [from hearsay] was based upon agency principles, the underlying con-
cept being that a conspiracy is a common undertaking where the conspirators
are all agents of each other and where the acts and statements of one can be
attributed to all.").
234. See id. at 2786-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
Thus, unlike many common-law hearsay exceptions, the co-conspira-
tor exemption from hearsay with its agency rationale was not based
primarily upon any particular guarantees of reliability or trustworthi-
ness that were intended to ensure the truthfulness of the admitted
statement and to compensate for the fact that a party would not have
the opportunity to test its veracity by cross-examining the declarant.
As such, this exemption was considered to be a "vicarious admission."
Although not an admission by a defendant himself, the vicarious ad-
mission was a statement imputed to the defendant from the co-
conspirator on the basis of their agency relationship. As with all ad-
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cessity23 5 are commonly asserted to support the common law
co-conspirator hearsay exception. The Court overlooked the
fact that the adversary system rationale led the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to define co-conspirator statements
as not hearsay rather than include them as a hearsay exception
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803.236 Thus, in Bourjaily the
Court answered the question posed by the "indicia of reliabil-
ity" prong of Roberts23 7 without ever exploring the reliability of
co-conspirator statements. In fact, the court in Bourjaily
changed the concept of firmly rooted from a means of inferring
indicia of reliability into an alternative method of satisfying the
second prong of Roberts. Bourjaily arguably may stand for the
proposition that any statement of a nonappearing declarant
meeting the requirements of a firmly rooted hearsay exception
does not run afoul of the confrontation clause. Under that
gloss courts will not examine a firmly rooted hearsay exception
to determine whether it in fact possesses adequate inidica of re-
liability. The long-standing tradition will be sufficient.23 8
In short, Bourjaily supports an interpretation of the con-
frontation clause that statements falling within any traditional
common law hearsay exception are sufficiently reliable to be
admitted against the defendant and that the unavailability re-
quirement of the confrontation clause is congruent with the un-
availability requirement of the traditional common law hearsay
exceptions.
missions, an "adversary system," rather than a reliability, rationale
was used to account for the exemption to the ban on hearsay: it was
thought that a party could not complain of the deprivation of the
right to cross-examine himself (or another authorized to speak for
him) or to advocate his own, or his agent's, untrustworthiness. The
co-conspirator "admission" exception was also justified on the ground
that the need for this evidence, which was particularly valuable in
prosecuting a conspiracy, permitted a somewhat reduced concern for
the reliability of the statement.
Id. at 2786 (citations and footnotes omitted).
235. See id.
236. See id. at 2787 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Advisory Committee
explained that the exclusion of admissions from the hearsay category is justi-
fied by the traditional 'adversary system' rationale, not by any specific 'guaran-
tee of trustworthiness' used to justify hearsay exceptions.").
237. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
238. The practical concern with assisting the government in prosecuting
drug traffickers and other co-conspirators, see supra note 235 (necessity), and
the benefit and burden concerns expressed in Inadi, see supra notes 153-71, ap-
pear to have greatly influenced the Court.
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IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: THE DILEMMA
A. THE CHALLENGE
If the confrontation clause sometimes requires production
of an available declarant before reliable and necessary hearsay
statements239 may be admitted, the challenge is to devise a
method to identify the statements that require such production.
The Court in Inadi made the challenge more difficult by re-
jecting several limitations on the admissibility of hearsay state-
ments. Dutton v. Evans240 was subject to the interpretation,
reinforced by the normally required production language of
Ohio v. Roberts,2 that an available declarant must be produced
whenever introduction of the hearsay statement would not, on
the bases of reliability and incremental probative value, be
harmless error.24 The Inadi Court, however, spoke in neither
normally required production nor harmless error terms,243 but
rather in terms of the importance of co-conspirators' state-
ments in comparison with the declarant's trial testimony.
Moreover, the Court in Inadi sanctioned admitting highly
incrementally probative hearsay statements on the basis of reli-
ability.24  The Court suggested no limiting language. It
equated the normally required production language of Roberts
with the unavailability requirement already imposed by hear-
say exceptions on the admissibility of former testimony.2 5 The
Inadi Court completely disregarded the crucial or devastating
impact language of Evans.
Furthermore, Inadi could be read as permitting admission
of all reliable hearsay statements246 against a criminal defend-
ant without production of an available declarant. If the firmly
rooted component of the Roberts Court's second prong,247 which
will likely be interpreted as liberally as in Boujaily,248 encom-
passes all delineated hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of
239. Reliable and necessary hearsay statements are out-of-court statements
that possess incremental probative value as to an important fact for conviction
in the litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11 and infra note 365.
240. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
241. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
242. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
244. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-400 (1986).
245. See id.
246. See supra notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
247. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
248. 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 230-
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Evidence, 249 under Inadi a finding that a hearsay statement sat-
isfied any such hearsay exception would apparently carry with
it a determination that the confrontation clause does not re-
quire production of an available declarant. In short, reliability
satisfying the second prong of Roberts would also, under Inadi,
satisfy the first prong of Roberts, which deals nominally with
unavailability but actually with reliability as well.
The Court's reference in Inadi to the defendant's right to
call an available declarant 250 lends support to this argument.
The Court noted that the defendant neither subpeonaed the
witness nor attempted to seek his cross-examination under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the compulsory process
clause.251 The Court therefore concluded that a rule requiring
the prosecution to make the witness available would be un-
likely "to produce much testimony that adds anything to the
'truth determining process' over and above what would be pro-
duced without such a rule. '252
The Inadi Court placed only one limitation on its analysis.
The Court interpreted Roberts as confirming the long-standing
249. FED. R. EvD. 801(d), 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4).
250. 475 U.S. at 397-98; see supra note 166 and infra notes 330-31 and ac-
companying text.
251. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397; see infra note 252.
252. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
The Court stated:
Some of the available declarants already will have been subpoenaed
by the prosecution or the defense, regardless of any Confrontation
Clause requirements. Presumably only those declarants that neither
side believes will be particularly helpful will not have been subpoe-
naed as witnesses. There is much to indicate that Lazaro was in that
position in this case. Neither the Government nor the defense origi-
nally subpoenaed Lazaro as a witness. When he subsequently failed
to show, alleging car trouble, respondent did nothing to secure his tes-
timony. If respondent independently wanted to secure Lazaro's testi-
mony, he had several options available, particularly under Federal
Rule of Evidence 806, which provides that if the party against whom a
co-conspirator statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a
witness, "the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if
under cross-examination." Rule 806 would not require respondent to
make the showing necessary to have Lazaro declared a hostile wit-
ness, although presumably that option also was available to him. The
Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining
the testimony of any of these declarants. If the Government has no
desire to call a co-conspirator declarant . . . either as a witness
favorable to the defense, or as a hostile witness, or for cross-examina-
tion under Federal Rule of Evidence 806, then it is difficult to see
what, if anything, is gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to
make that declarant "available."
Id. at 396-98 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 166 (quoting Inadi).
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position that former testimony253 is inferior in probative value
to live testimony before the trier of fact.254 The Inadi Court, of
253. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court evaluated the ad-
missibility of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness unavailable because
of lack of recollection. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. Noting
that the declarant was under oath at the preliminary hearing and that the de-
fendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at that time, the
Court held that substantive admissibility of the preliminary hearing testimony
did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. 399 U.S. at 165-68.
Under Green defendants must have an opportunity to effectively cross-ex-
amine the witness; opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing is
not per se adequate. See 399 U.S. at 159. Unless the defense was limited by
unusual circumstances, however, the cross-examination opportunity provided
in the preliminary hearing ordinarily will be sufficient. See, e.g., People v.
Wittebort, 81 Mich. App. 529, 532-34, 265 N.W.2d 404, 405-06 (1978) (holding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting preliminary hearing
testimony when defense counsel's failure to cross-examine the witness was
due to the likelihood that cross-examination would have been "counter-pro-
ductive" rather than to the alleged incompetency of counsel). The question of
an adequate opportunity to conduct cross-examination in a child sexual abuse
prosecution would arise if a child witness capable of direct examination an-
swers incoherently or inconsistently, claims lack of recollection, or answers
not at all when asked questions on cross-examination, including calmly
presented, simple questions in understandable language. See supra note 202
and accompanying text.
Courts interpreting Green generally agree that admissibility turns on
whether the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine effectively, not
whether defense counsel actually engaged in extensive cross-examination. See,
e.g., State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 504, 289 A.2d 894, 896 (1971) (noting "the
test is the opportunity for full and complete cross-examination rather than the
use of that opportunity"). Nevertheless, the issue has not been totally re-
solved. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that under Green a court could ad-
mit preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness offered by the
prosecution when the witness had been called by the defense at the prelimi-
nary hearing and examined as a hostile witness. 448 U.S. 56, 67-73 (1980).
Although in Roberts defense counsel never formally asked the court to declare
the witness hostile or to allow him to cross examine the witness, his questions
were the functional equivalent of cross-examination. Id. at 70-73. The Court
noted that counsel on direct challenged the witness's perception of events and
her veracity and had not been limited in this line of questioning. Id. at 71; see
supra note 135 and accompanying text. The result was, as in Green, a "'sub-
stantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation require-
ment."' 448 U.S. at 71 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 166). The Court added,
however, that it need not determine whether mere opportunity to cross-ex-
amine or de minimis questioning is sufficient under Green, because defense
counsel's questions were the equivalent of extensive cross-examination. Id. at
70; see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
254. The Court in Inadi stated:
Unlike some other exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the exemption
from the hearsay definition involved in this case, former testimony
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has in-
dependent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended to re-
place live testimony. If the declarant is available and the same
information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
course, did not hold that a party need never produce an avail-
able declarant provided it can demonstrate reliability. The In-
adi Court also did not specifically discard the first prong of
Roberts. Reading Inadi with less force, the question is under
what circumstances a party must produce an available declar-
ant whose statement meets a firmly rooted hearsay exception
or possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness so the
prosecution can examine the declarant. Commentators must
address that question in light of the Court's references in Inadi
to the defendant's opportunity, under the compulsory process
clause, to produce and examine an available declarant if the de-
fendant so desires. 255
B. COMMENTATORS' SUGGESTIONS
The commentators who have attempted to discover the
true meaning of the confrontation clause have focused on prin-
ciples the Supreme Court developed in Evans256 and repeated
in Roberts.257 The commentators have attempted to design flex-
ible criteria to determine the "utility of trial confrontation."' ss
Professor Frank Read, for example, stated that a rule requiring
production of available hearsay declarants would conflict with
exceptions excusing witnesses whose presence would be incon-
venient or unhelpful to the defendant.25 9 Read proposed excus-
ing the declarant's unavailability if the inconvenience of
producing the declarant would outweigh the benefits, or if the
declarant would be a minor witness who would testify to a
technical and uncontested detail.260
testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view
the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying
on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as
well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence. But
if the declarant is unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence ex-
ists, and the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live
testimony on the same point.
475 U.S. at 394-95 (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 397.
256. 400 U.S. 74 (1970); see supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
257. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see supra notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
258. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
259. Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
43 (1972).
260. Id. at 49. Professor Read posed the questions:
Can the unavailability of the witness, under the facts, be excused be-
cause the inconvenience caused by producing him (as in business-
records-exceptions cases), outweighs any possible benefit his presence
could afford the accused? Is the witness a minor witness called to
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Similarly, Professor Kenneth Graham proposed limiting
the meaning of witnesses against a defendant, for confrontation
clause purposes, to principal witnesses for the prosecution, in-
cluding those witnesses necessary for the prosecution to survive
a motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of proof.26 1 Before
hearsay statements would be admissible, under this interpreta-
tion, the confrontation clause would require the prosecution to
produce witnesses whose contributions make them principal
witnesses. On the other hand, a court would not require the
prosecution to produce declarants whose statements are not
crucial to the litigation. 262
Professor Peter Westen asserted that confrontation analy-
sis should not entail an inquiry into the reliability of a hearsay
declaration.263 He argued that the indicia of reliability test de-
rived from the due process clause rather than the confrontation
clause.26 In addressing the question under what circum-
stances, pursuant to the confrontation clause, the prosecution
must produce an available declarant, Westen suggested that
courts should allow the prosecution to introduce a hearsay
statement only after the prosecution has made a good faith ef-
fort to produce the declarant at trial and to elicit the statement
there.265 Westen would allow an exception to this rule in those
cases in which the "statement is such that the defendant could
not reasonably be expected to wish to examine the declarant in
supply a technical, basically uncontested detail as opposed to a key
prosecution witness?
Id. Others have agreed that "[t]he defendant is likely to waive his right to
cross-examine the declarant in cases where the hearsay involves only perfunc-
tory collateral matters or appears particularly reliable." The Supreme Cour4
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 195-96 (1971) (footnote omitted).
261. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRnM. L. BULL. 99, 129 (1972).
262. Id. Professor Graham wrote:
What then emerges from this view of the confrontation clause? I
suggest that it implies that whether or not a particular person is a
"witness against" the defendant depends upon the use to which his
statements are to be put. If his contribution makes him the "principal
witness" for the prosecution ... he must be confronted, absent excuse
or waiver. If, on the other hand his "testimony" is not "crucial," as
the Court said the statement was not in Dutton, the prosecution need
not produce him at trial. Vague as they may be, these respective cate-
gories require an analysis of the evidence in the context of the case
rather than in the abstract.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970)).
263. See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified The-
ory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567, 599-600 (1978).
264. Id. at 600.
265. Id. at 617.
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person.' '26 6 Westen thus concluded that the prosecution must
"take the initiative in producing only those witnesses (whose
statements it uses) whom it can reasonably expect the defend-
ant to wish to examine at trial. '267
To illustrate the operation of his approach, Westen dis-
cussed its application to the facts of Evans.268 He asserted that
the Court's decision to uphold admissibility of the hearsay
statement in Evans was consistent with his interpretation of
the purposes of the confrontation clause.269 Westen noted that
the hearsay statement in Evans was ambiguous, and the jury
was unlikely to give it undue weight.2 7 0 He further noted that
the defendant likely could not have cast doubt on the state-
ment's reliability by cross-examining the declarant at trial.Y1
Thus, Westen concluded that because the prosecution could
have reasonably concluded that the defendant had no interest
in examining Williams in person, it was excused from produc-
ing Williams on its own initiative.27 2
Unfortunately, such an interpretation brings in through
the back door what Westen originally rejected. Namely, under
his approach courts would employ the confrontation clause to
measure the reliability of any available witness's hearsay state-
ment. Moreover, Westen's interpretation reintroduces an as-
sessment of both the incremental probative value of the
evidence in establishing a proposition and the importance of the
proposition in the litigation-criteria that plagued the plurality
opinion in Evans.273 In addition, as Westen recognized, his in-
terpretation also would require appellate courts to develop a
standard for reviewing the reasonableness of the prosecution's
determination that the defendant would not have wanted to ex-
amine the declarant in person.2 7 4
Finally, Professor Laird Kirkpatrick suggested using four
criteria to determine when a party must call an available de-
266. Id. at 617-18.
267. Id. at 622.
268. For a discussion of Evans, see supra notes 94-117 and accompanying
text.
269. Westen, supra note 263, at 621.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 107-09 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the plurality's holding that a defendant need not be given an
opportunity to confront a hearsay declarant if the evidence admitted is not
"crucial" or "devastating").
274. Westen, supra note 263, at 622.
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clarant at trial: centrality, reliability, susceptibility to testing
by cross-examination, and the adequacy of alternatives to cross-
examination.275 The centrality criterion focuses on the impor-
tance of the matter the evidence is offered to prove.2 6 Reliabil-
ity significantly resembles the third criterion, susceptibility to
testing by cross-examination. In any case, reliability most cer-
tainly includes an assessment of whether the declarant actually
made the statement.2 7 Susceptibility to testing by cross-exami-
nation refers to the availability of documentary hearsay such as
business records or transcripts of testimony in cases in which
the declarant may not fully recall the matter stated.278 Ade-
quacy of alternatives to cross-examination includes opportunity
to impeach the hearsay declarant under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 806, to introduce contrary evidence, and, under unusual
circumstances, to cross-examine another witness familiar with
the matter.27 9
Each of the commentators' proposals searches for indicia of
reliability that would make remote the utility of trial cross-ex-
amination. Arguably, each test would reasonably assess the
constitutionality, under the confrontation clause, of admitting
evidence possessing minimal incremental probative value and
addressing an unimportant aspect of the litigation. When the
evidence possesses significant incremental probative value and
addresses an important fact in the litigation, however, each of
the utility of trial cross-examination tests would provide a re-
sult contrary to Inadi. This conclusion explains the Inadi
Court's references not only to indicia of reliability and neces-
sity, but also to burden and benefit, including, as an alternative,
the defendant's calling the witness.28 0 In short, each of the
commentators' approaches would require a party to produce an
available declarant in instances in which crucial or devastating
hearsay evidence involves a co-conspirator statement. Yet the
Inadi Court did not so require.
275. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Con-
stitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 682 (1986).
276. See id. at 683.
277. Id. Professor Kirkpatrick stated: "To the extent a high degree of reli-
ability can be independently established, the utility of cross-examination is
diminished. The more reliable the hearsay, the less likely it is to be qualified
or repudiated by the declarant, no matter how skillful the cross examination."
Id. (footnote omitted).
278. Id. at 684.
279. See id. at 685.
280. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
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C. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
The Inadi Court's elimination of the crucial or devastating
language of Evans and the Court's incorporation of burden and
benefit considerations complicate the issue of admissibility of
videotaped statements. Videotaped hearsay statements may be
admissible under the statutory hearsay exceptions of some
states for videotaped statements.281 Statutory hearsay excep-
tions permitting admissibility of videotaped statements gener-
ally require that the defendant be able to call and examine the
declarant at trial.28 2
Several questions arise under such statutory exceptions.
What does Inadi say as to requiring the prosecution to call an
available child declarant to testify? What does Inadi suggest
regarding satisfaction of the Roberts Court's two-prong test by
requiring the availability of the child declarant so the defend-
ant may call the child? Does Inadi suggest that the defendant's
compulsory process right to produce and cross-examine an
available declarant satisfies both prongs of Roberts in cases in
which the government's burden in producing the declarant is
greater than the defendant's benefit in being able to confront
the declarant of a reliable and necessary hearsay statement?
Does the burden to the government include the risk of expos-
ing a victim of child sexual abuse to possible trauma or emo-
tional distress by requiring the child to recount the sexual
abuse in open court, face-to-face with the accused?
A recent Kansas decision highlights the dilemma of apply-
ing Inadi to child sexual abuse prosecutions. In State v.
Johnson283 the Kansas Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of two Kansas statutes which provided for the admissi-
bility of the videotaped statements of a child alleged to be the
victim of a crime.284 Section 22-3433 of the Kansas Statutes
provides for the admissibility of a child victim's videotaped
statement made before the initiation of criminal proceedings if,
among other things, no attorney is present during taping.285 In
addition, the child must be available for cross-examination,
either in the courtroom or during the videotaping of a separate
281. See statutes cited supra note 184.
282. See statutes cited supra note 184.
283. 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2466 (1987).
284. See id. at 327-32, 729 P.2d at 1171-75 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-
3433 to -3434 (Supp. 1986)).
285. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3433 (Supp. 1986).
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statement.28 6 Section 22-3434 provides for the admissibility of a
child victim's videotaped statement made after the initiation of
criminal proceedings if, among other things, only the attorneys,
the child, and any persons important to the child's welfare are
present; only the attorneys question the child; and the child
neither sees nor hears the defendant, if the defendant is pres-
ent.28 7 Section 22-3434 further provides that a child who has
given videotaped testimony in accordance with -the statute may
not be compelled to testify at trial.
28
In Johnson the trial court admitted videotaped testimony
pursuant to the statutes.2 9 The defendant had been charged
with taking indecent liberties with his daughter, R.J., and of
committing aggravated criminal sodomy with his stepson,
J.W.290 R.J. made the first part of the videotaped testimony
pursuant to section 22-3433, during which only she and a social
worker were present.291 When R.J. made the second part of
the videotaped testimony, pursuant to section 22-3434, R.J., her
foster mother, a social worker, and both parties' attorneys were
present.2 92 On videotape, R.J. testified that the defendant had
taken liberties with her and that she had seen the defendant
sodomize J.W.2 93 Neither party called R.J. to testify at trial,
and the court did not find R.J. to be unavailable.
294
The jury convicted Johnson of aggravated sodomy of J.W.
but did not reach a verdict on the charge of indecent liberties
with R.J.295 Accordingly, the trial court declared a mistrial on
the indecent liberties charges.296 Johnson appealed, arguing
that admission of R.J.'s videotaped testimony under sections 22-
3433 and 22-3434 violated his right of confrontation.
297
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld Johnson's convic-
tion.298 The court concluded that section 22-3433 did not violate
the confrontation clause because the statute required the court
286. Id.
287. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (Supp. 1986).
288. Id.
289. 240 Kan. 326, 326-27, 729 P.2d 1169, 1170-71 (1986).
290. Id. at 326, 729 P.2d at 1170.
291. Id. at 326-27, 729 P.2d at 1170-71.
292. Id. The defendant was not present during the videotaping. Id. at 327,
729 P.2d at 1171.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 327, 331, 729 P.2d at 1171, 1174.
295. Id. at 327, 729 P.2d at 1171.
296. Id. These charges were later dismissed upon the State's motion. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 333, 729 P.2d at 1175.
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to find sufficient indicia of reliability before admitting the
videotaped testimony and because the child must be available
for cross-examination either in the courtroom or on video-
tape.299 The court found its decision consistent with its previ-
ous decision in State v. Myatt,300 which upheld the validity of
another Kansas statute providing a hearsay exception for state-
ments of child victims of sexual abuse.30 1
The Johnson court further found that section 22-3434 did
not violate the confrontation clause, notwithstanding the stat-
ute's provision that a child victim giving videotaped testimony
under that statute may not be compelled to testify at trial.30 2
The court concluded that because the child is subject to cross-
examination during the videotaping under section 22-3434, the
attorneys have sufficient opportunity to bring out factors bear-
ing on the trustworthiness and reliability of the child's state-
ments.303 Consequently, the court found that the trial court did
not need to reconsider those attributes of the child witness.3°4
The court held therefore that the admission of the child's vide-
otaped testimony did not violate the defendant's confrontation
clause rights.305 That holding illustrates the potential impact of
299. Id. at 332, 729 P.2d at 1174.
300. 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985). The Johnson court applied the two-
part test of Myatt:
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-3433 does not violate a defendant's right to con-
frontation because the child must be available to testify and be cross-
examined either in the courtroom or as provided by K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
22-3434. Moreover, the statute requires that the court find the state-
ment contains "sufficient indicia of reliability" before it can be admit-
ted. Thus, K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-3433 satisfies the two-part test set out
in Myatt for admission of child victim hearsay.
240 Kan. at 331, 729 P.2d at 1174 (citing Myatt, 237 Kan. at 24, 697 P.2d at 843).
301. Myatt, 237 Kan. at 25, 697 P.2d at 843.
In Myatt, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the validity of § 60.460(dd) of
the Kansas Statutes, which created a hearsay exception applicable only to
child declarants based on a particularized finding of indicia of reliability. 237
Kan. at 25, 679 P.2d at 843. The Myatt court held the statute constitutional
because it allowed the introduction of the hearsay statement only if the child
was unavailable and the statement was reliable. Id. at 24, 679 P.2d at 843. The
Myatt court noted that because children may be unable to testify at trial be-
cause of retraction of earlier statements due to guilt or fear, fading memory,
or tender years, their hearsay statements may be the only probative evidence
available. Id. at 21-22, 679 P.2d at 841. The court also noted that children's
statements about sexual abuse are inherently reliable because children often
lack knowledge of sexual matters. Id. The court further noted the increasing
incidence of child sexual abuse. Id.; see supra note 52.
302. Johnson, 240 Kan. at 332, 729 P.2d at 1174.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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political pressure to protect alleged victims of child sexual
abuse from the trauma or emotional distress of testifying
before the defendant in open court.
Under section 22-3434, as in other recently enacted video-
taping statutes,30 6 the child victim testifies before court pro-
ceedings begin, is subject to cross-examination, and is outside
the defendant's physical presence. Section 22-3434, however,
differs from other statutes30 7 because it requires no showing of
unavailability before videotaped testimony may be admitted in
evidence. Moreover, section 22-3434(4) provides that, even if
the child is available, the child may not be compelled to testify
in court. Thus, section 22-3434 violates Roberts, which requires
a showing of unavailability before prior testimony is
admissible.308
Section 22-3433 raises similar confrontation clause issues.
Section 22-3433 is designed to permit admissibility of a child vic-
tim's videotaped testimony to a social worker. Under Roberts,
admissibility of a prior statement in accordance with the con-
frontation clause depends on the statement's reliability and the
declarant's unavailability.30 9 Although section 22-3433 requires
that the statement be reliable,31 0 it does not require a showing
of unavailability. Thus, in the unlikely event that a statement
complies with the reliability prong of Roberts,311 admission of
306. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Section 16D allows testimony of a child victim to be videotaped for use in
court at a later time, provided that the court finds that the child witness is
likely to suffer trauma as a result of testifying in open court or in the defend-
ant's presence. Counsel must be given the opportunity to examine or cross-
examine the child witness to the same extent as would be permitted at trial.
Id. The defendant has a right to be present, unless the court finds the defend-
ant's presence is likely to cause the child witness to suffer trauma. Id. Upon
such a finding, the court may order that the child witness, while testifying, not
be able to see or hear the defendant. Id. See generally statutes cited supra
note 184 (providing for admissibility of a child victim's testimony by videotape
or closed-circuit television).
307. See, ag., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1987) (requiring a sub-
stantial likelihood that the child would suffer emotional or mental harm if re-
quired to testify in court or that the child is otherwise unavailable); see supra
note 185 and accompanying text.
308. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
309. Id.; see supra notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
310. Section 22-3433(1) provides that a recorded statement of a child wit-
ness must show "sufficient indicia of reliability" to be admissible.
311. See Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation;
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MAm L. REv. 19,
57 (1985). The author wrote:
Applying the relevant factors, proponents will often succeed in intro-
ducing the child's initial statement that describes the act of sexual
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the statement nevertheless would pose a confrontation clause
problem because the unavailability prong of Roberts312 has not
been met.
Section 22-3433 attempts to solve the confrontation clause
problem by simply allowing the defendant to call the child to
testify at trial.313 Underlying the statute is the rationale that
while the likely benefit of cross-examination of a child victim
in court is slight, the burden of possible trauma or severe emo-
tional distress to the child if required to accuse the defendant
in open court is significant. That rationale also prompted the
Texas legislature to rely on the compulsory process clause to
address the confrontation clause problem in its videotaping
statute.314 The Texas Court of Appeals, however, declared that
statute unconstitutional under the confrontation clause.315 The
contact performed with or on the child by another, as well as addi-
tional statements made immediately after the initial statement. It is,
however, extremely doubtful that a child's statement to a police of-
ficer, social worker, or someone specially trained to interview chil-
dren will be found to possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, whether or not the statement was videotaped or
otherwise recorded. The normal timing of such an interview, its in-
vestigative function, the frequent use of suggestive questions by a per-
son in authority, and the fact that the child will usually have made
several earlier statements relating to the alleged sexual contact all
militate against admissibility. Such investigatory statements are
somewhat analagous [sic] to grand jury testimony which has received
a checkered response when offered under Federal Rule of Evidence
Rule 804(b)(5).
Id.
312. 448 U.S. at 65-66.
313. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3433(b) (Supp. 1986) ("If a recording is ad-
mitted in evidence under this section, any party to the proceeding may call the
child to testify and be cross-examined, either in the courtroom or as provided
by K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-3434 and amendments thereto.").
314. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987),
held unconstitutional by Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 193 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985), affd, 56 U.S.L.W. 2031, 2031 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 1987) (No. 867-85)
(en banc) (state petitioning for discretionary review; opinion subject to revi-
sion or withdrawal from permanent law report).
315. Long, 694 S.W.2d at 193. Nine Texas Courts of Appeal had upheld ar-
ticle 38.021, section two, before Long, 56 U.S.L.W. at 2031, held it unconstitu-
tional. See Pierce v. State, 724 S.W. 2d 928, 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Amescua
v. State, 723 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Woods v. State, 713 S.W.2d
173, 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Whittemore v. State, 712 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986); Mallory v. State, 699 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); New-
man v. State, 700 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Tolbert v. State, 697
S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563, 566
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Two Texas Courts of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional. Buckner v.
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Texas statute, 16 on which the Kansas statute317 was modeled,
provided for the admissibility of a child's videotaped statement
if no attorney was present during the videotaping and the child
was available to testify at trial.318 The Texas statute did not re-
quire the prosecution to call the child during its case in chief,
but merely required that the child be available for the defend-
ant to call and examine, and presumably cross-examine if the
defendant so chose.319 The Texas statute, like the Kansas stat-
ute,320 was based on the notion that the right of confrontation is
satisfied as long as the hearsay declarant is available for the de-
fendant to call and examine at trial.321
Before United States v. Inadi,322 the unconstitutionality of
the Texas statute was obvious. No Supreme Court decision de-
State, 719 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Romines v. State, 717 S.W.2d
745, 753 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
For other cases applying various types of videotape statutes, see, e.g., Mc-
Guire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 393, 706 S.W.2d 360, 362-63 (1986) (holding video-
tape statements admissible); People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. App. 3d 640, 649-50, 497
N.E.2d 308, 314 (1986) (holding videotape of child sex abuse victim taken
outside of defendant's presence admissible because defendant's rights to con-
front and cross-examine declarant were preserved); Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d
1008, 1012-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding victim's videotaped statements ad-
missible); Altmeyer v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (hold-
ing unavailable child's videotaped testimony inadmissible because of
insufficient indicia of reliability); State v. Tafoya, 105 N.M. 117, 122, 729 P.2d
1371, 1376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (holding videotaped prior consistent state-
ments of child sex abuse victim admissible), cert denied, 105 N.M. 94, 728 P.2d
845 (1986), petition for cert filed (Feb. 12, 1987); Turner v. State, 716 S.W.2d
569, 571 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), review granted (Oct. 14, 1987) (holding videotape
admissible under article 38.071, §§ 4, 5); Taylor v. State, 727 P.2d 274, 274 (Wyo.
1986) (holding videotape of child sex abuse victim taken by police officers sev-
eral days after alleged crime inadmissible because trial court permitted jury to
view the tape during deliberations).
316. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
Kentucky adopted this Texas statute as KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). A Kentucky court declared the statute
constitutional in Eastman v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986) (withdrawn from bound volume because discretionary review is pending)
(available on WESTLAW, TX-CS database).
317. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3433 (Supp. 1986); see supra notes 284-86 and ac-
companying text.
318. TEx. CODE CRI. PROc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2.
319. Id.
320. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
321. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2. Because a videotape
gives the jury an opportunity to observe the child's demeanor and judge credi-
bility, supporters of the statute also argued the child is in effect called to the
stand by the playing of the videotape. Buckner v. State, 719 S.W.2d 644, 651
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (Burdock, J., dissenting).
322. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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claring the procedures outlined in the statute unconstitutional
existed simply because no one had been bold enough before the
statute's enactment to test those procedures in the face of the
history of the confrontation clause, its language, and the
Supreme Court decisions touching on the subject. In writing
the confrontation clause, the framers required that an available
complaining witness be called and examined by the prosecution
in open court, and that the witness be subjected to cross-exami-
nation by the defendant.323 The compulsory process clause
gives the accused the right to present evidence in her favor;32
its purpose is not to permit the accused to present and examine
witnesses against her, as the Texas statute apparently contem-
plated. The language of the sixth amendment requires the
prosecution to present evidence. 325 The confrontation clause
does not merely say "to confront," which could more easily be
interpreted to mean cross-examine only. The compulsory pro-
cess clause provides that the defendant shall have the right "to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. '326 "Witnesses in his favor" means witnesses tending to
establish the defendant's innocence. The compulsory process
clause does not state "witnesses against him," as apparently
contemplated by the Texas statute. Until Inadi Supreme Court
decisions bearing on this point were in full accord.32 7
323. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The framers drafted the confrontation
clause in reaction to the same abuse that the Texas statute reintroduced-trial
by ex parte affidavit. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895);
infra note 327.
324. See U.S. CONST. amend. VL
325. See id. The confrontation clause provides that "the accused shall en-
joy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. In Mattox the Court said:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes ad-
mitted in civil cases, [from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.
In 1899 the Court again considered the right of confrontation. In Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), the Court stated:
The record showing the result of the trial of the principal felons was
undoubtedly evidence, as against them, in respect of every fact essen-
tial to show their guilt. But a fact which can be primarily established
only by witnesses cannot be proved against an accused--charged with
[Vol. 72:523
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Over the years the Supreme Court decided many cases in-
volving the admissibility of hearsay statements of available, un-
available, and available but nontestifying declarants. Evans and
Roberts represent the last of this long line of decisions.328 In
every decision, the Court implicitly premised its discussion on
the firm principle that the confrontation clause requires the
prosecution to call available witnesses whose testimony is cru-
cial and devastating at trial for examination in the presence of
the accused and for cross-examination by defense counsel.329
None of those decisions hinted even slightly that the sixth
amendment permits the prosecution to introduce an ex parte
affidavit or videotaped statement merely because the accused
may call and examine such a witness at trial.
In Inadi the Court departed from its traditional sixth
amendment interpretation and held that the prosecution need
not call the declarant of a crucial and devastating statement at
trial because the defendant can call the declarant pursuant to
the compulsory process clause.330 The Court stated that in light
of the defendant's opportunity to call the declarant at trial, lit-
tle, if anything, is gained by requiring the prosecution to make
the declarant available.331
In fact, however, requiring the prosecutor to produce and
examine a child declarant at trial has readily apparent advan-
tages. If the prosecution may substitute belated for timely
cross-examination, the child declarant may develop an interest
in maintaining the prior statement and "'become unyielding to
the blows of truth.' "332 In addition, the jury will often be ex-
a different offence [sic], for which he may be convicted without refer-
ence to the principal offender---except by witnesses who confront him
at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is en-
titled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in
every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or
conduct of criminal cases.
Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
328. See supra notes 94-143 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-90 (1970) (premising discus-
sion implicitly on principle that confrontation clause requires available com-
plaining witness to appear at trial for examination in presence of accused and
cross-examination by defense).
330. 475 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1986).
331. Id. at 398; see also supra note 252 (quoting Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396-98).
332. Romines v. State, 717 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970)). The Romines court wrote:
The main danger in substituting subsequent for timely, cross-examina-
tion seems to lie in the possibility that the witness' "[f]alse testimony
is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in pro-
portion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influ-
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posed to a double dose of the child's testimony regarding the al-
leged abuse because the defense attorney, to effectively cross-
examine, will have to take the child through videotaped testi-
mony, impressing the event on the jurors' minds.333 The Texas
statute334 allowed the prosecution to introduce the child's vide-
otaped statements, which had been taken in a friendly environ-
ment, but required defense counsel to call the child to testify in
court and possibly subject the child to the kind of trauma the
statute was designed to avoid.335 By calling the child, the de-
fense counsel would further predispose the jury against the de-
fendant.336 Furthermore, the child may not remember the
details of the event.337 Under the statute the videotaped state-
ment could be made after the prosecution had prepared the
child regarding the child's version of the critical events.338
Surely a statute like the Texas statute does not reduce trauma
or emotional distress resulting from face-to-face confrontation
with the defendant if the defendant exercises the right to call
the child to the witness stand at trial.
Even if defense counsel risks angering the jury by calling
the child, thereby exposing the child to the possibility of suffer-
ing trauma or emotional distress, cross-examination of the child
regarding the videotaped statement will be difficult because de-
fense counsel does not know whether the child will testify in
ence by the suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and often is,
to maintain falsehood rather than truth."
Id.
333. See id. at 752. The court stated:
[Tlhe child would surely have had to reiterate her previous adverse
testimony or had her memory orally refreshed by appellant's counsel
in order for him to effectively cross-examine her about the videotaped
testimony. This would have given the jury a 'double dose' of the
harmful and detrimental testimony against appellant. This 'double
dose' may... result in more indelibly impressing same on the minds
of the individual jurors.
Id.
334. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987), held
unconstitutional by Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985),
affd, 56 U.S.L.W. 2031, 2031 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 1987) (No. 867-85) (en
banc) (state petitioning for discretionary review; opinion subject to revision or
withdrawal from permanent law report).
335. See id. at 751-52.
336. See id. at 752.
337. See id. at 752-53 (noting that "[c]ross-examination of a three-year-old
child eight months after the videotape was made cannot serve as a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for cross-examination contemporaneous with
statements presented for consideration by the jury").
338. See art. 38.071, § 2(a)(1). The statute provides only that the prosecut-
ing attorney cannot be present at the videotaping session. Id.
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conformity with the prepared statement. If the child says the
same thing, the defendant's position may be significantly dam-
aged. If the child testifies inconsistently, or claims not to re-
member, however, fundamental issues arise, such as whether
the child's videotaped statement is substantively admissible
when the child testifies inconsistently or whether the theory of
admissibility is limited solely to that of prior consistent state-
ments. Under Roberts the prior statement of a child who fails
to remember is inadmissible unless it possesses sufficient indi-
cia of reliability,3 3 9 which is unlikely considering the surround-
ing circumstances, including the fact that the statement was
prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Inclusion in the Uniform Rules of Evidence of the Inadi
notion that the confrontation clause may be satisfied by placing
the burden of producing the hearsay declarant on the accused
under the rubric of the compulsory process clause3 40 demon-
strates the notion's perniciousness. In 1986 the National Com-
missioners of Uniform State Laws approved a new Uniform
Rule of Evidence creating a limited hearsay exception for the
introduction of videotaped statements of child witnesses.4 1
Uniform Rule of Evidence 807 is an unfortunate blend of the
statutory hearsay exceptions requiring a particularized finding
of guarantees of trustworthiness of an available declarant 34
and the Texas-type statute permitting videotaped statements
prepared in anticipation of litigation. 343 Subdivision (a)(i) of
the Rule provides for the admissibility of a child's hearsay
statement if, among other things, the court finds that "there is
a substantial likelihood that the minor will suffer severe emo-
tional or psychological harm if required to testify in open
court."' 44 Subsection (a)(ii) requires the court to find that the
"time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide suf-
ficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 3 45 Subdi-
vision (b) permits questioning of the minor on behalf of the
339. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980); see supra text accompanying note 133.
340. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
"'[o]nly a lawyer without trial experience would suggest that the limited right
to impeach one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to immediate
cross-examination which has always been regarded as the greatest safeguard of
American trial procedure"' (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147
F.2d 297, 305 (1945))).
341. See UNIF. R. EvD. 807 comment to 1986 amendment (Supp. 1987).
342. See supra text accompanying note 137.
343. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
344. UNIF. R. EVID. 807(a)(i) (Supp. 1987).
345. UNIF. R. EVID. 807(a)(ii).
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defendant.346 The comment to subdivision (b) indicates that
such questioning, taken at a deposition or by closed circuit testi-
mony, may be conducted outside the defendant's presence. 7
Subdivision (c), however, states that nothing in subdivision (a)
prevents "the court from permitting any party to call the minor
as a witness if the interests of justice so require." 8 The com-
ment to subdivision (c) states that "[c]onstitutionally, potential
confrontation clause concerns are ameliorated by permitting
any party, within the court's discretion, to call the child as a
witness."349
Subdivision (c) conflicts with subdivision (a)(i), which per-
mits admissibility of reliable hearsay statements when a sub-
stantial likelihood exists that requiring the child to testify in
open court will cause severe emotional or psychological harm to
the child.350 Subdivision (c) allows the court to permit either
party to call the child to testify as a witness, eyen though call-
ing the child to testify in open court would bause the exact
harm subdivision (a) is designed to prevent.
D. SUMMARY
The Inadi decision demonstrates the truth of Justice
Harlan's statement that the confrontation clause is not well
suited for testing rules of evidence.35' In addition, Justice Mar-
shall may have been ahead of his time when he noted the dan-
ger of constitutionalizing exceptions to the hearsay rule by
making them exceptions to the confrontation clause.352 Inadi
346. UNIF. R. EvID. 807(b) (providing that "the court shall, at the request of
the defendant, provide for further questioning of the minor in such manner as
the court may direct").
347. Id. comment (allowing trial judge to determine whether minor's testi-
mony should be taken in open court or by means of videotaped deposition or
closed circuit television under 807(d)); see also UNIF. R. EviD. 807(d) (providing
that court may order parties to remain outside of minors' presence while mi-
nor testifies).
348. UNiF. R. EVID. 807(c).
349. UNIF. R. EVID. 807(c) comment.
350. UNIF. R. EVID. 807(a)(i) (Supp. 1987).
351. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Harlan stated:
[T]he Confrontation Clause... is simply not well designed for taking
into account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on
the appropriateness of rules of evidence. The failure of MP_ JUSTICE
STEWART'S opinion to explain the standard by which it tests Shaw's
statement ... bears witness to the fact that the clause is being set a
task for which it is not suited.
Id.
352. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall said:
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and Bourjaily support Marshall's statement.3 5 3 Moreover, not
only does Inadi arguably reject the Evans Court's normally re-
quires production language by its use of compulsory process
language, Inadi supports the introduction of any available de-
clarant's statement simply because of the defendant's ability to
subpoena and examine the declarant as to the subject matter of
the statement at trial.Ym While Inadi no more truly supports
an extended compulsory process approach to the confrontation
clause than Roberts truly imposed a standard of normally re-
quiring production of an available declarant, Evans, Roberts, In-
adi, and Bourjaily show that a reliability approach to
interpreting the confrontation clause, combined with the no-
tions of necessity, burden, and benefit, is not satisfactory.
V. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A PROPOSAL
A. THE PROBLEM
The interpretation of the confrontation clause as developed
in Green, Evans, Roberts, Inadi, and Bourjaily allows introduc-
tion as substantive evidence of all prior hearsay statements of a
testifying witness whether the statements are inconsistent3 5 5 or
consistent 56 with the witness's in-court testimony. With re-
spect to a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement offered under
a hearsay exemption,35 7 for example, the court under Green
need not search for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness if the declarant testifies at trial, because oath, demeanor,
and cross-examination before the trier of fact meet the confron-
tation clause's requirement of indicia of reliability.3 5 8 If the de-
clarant is unavailable, hearsay statements that either meet a
firmly rooted hearsay exception or are shown to possess partic-
Indeed, if [Justice Stewart's] opinion meant what it says, it would
come very close to establishing in reverse the very equation it seeks to
avoid-an equation that would give any exception to a state hearsay
rule a "permanent niche in the Constitution" in the form of an excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause as well.
Id.
353. See supra notes 230-52 and accompanying text.
354. See 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986); supra notes 144-66, 243-52 and accom-
panying text.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 69-89.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
357. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, co-conspirators' statements
made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy are defined as
nonhearsay and are therefore exempt from the hearsay rule. See FED. R.
EvD. 801(d)(2)(E).
358. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-61 (1970).
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness are admissible. 359
If the witness is available but does not testify, hearsay
statements that meet a firmly rooted hearsay exception or are
shown to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
may nevertheless be admissible because the statements' indicia
of reliability, the remote utility of trial confrontation, and the
competing interests of public policy justify admissibility. 360 Re-
garding statements made by a declarant who is available but
does not tesify, Inadi and Bourjaily, if read broadly, support
the notions that hearsay statements falling within traditional
hearsay exceptions are sufficiently reliable on their face to be
admitted against the defendant and that the unavailability re-
quirement of the confrontation clause is congruent, or nearly
so, with the unavailability requirement of the traditional hear-
say exceptions. 361 In other words, with respect to deciding
when the confrontation clause requires the production of an
available declarant, the Inadi Court's emphasis on reliability
and necessity, as well as the burden and benefit to the par-
ties, 36 2 supports a change in the Roberts standard. This is par-
ticularly true when one considers its reference to the
compulsory process clause.363 After Inadi it is fair to at least
reverse the emphasis from the Roberts Court's normally re-
quires production standard to the following rule:
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, with respect to a hearsay statement admissible under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or on a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness, the confrontation clause does not normally require
a showing that the declarant is unavailable.
If the confrontation clause were interpreted as being totally
congruent with the hearsay rule and its exceptions, the last
phrase could read: "The confrontation clause requires a show-
ing of unavailability only when required by Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 804(b)."
Even if the foregoing is an overstatement, as I believe it is,
there nevertheless must be a theory as to when the confronta-
tion clause requires production of an available declarant. The
Evans and Inadi Courts spoke in terms of a search for trust-
359. See text accompanying note 7.
360. See supra notes 94-172 and accompanying text.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 144-72.
362. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-400 (1986). The Roberts standard normally re-
quires a showing of unavailability when a hearsay declarant is not present at
trial. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); see supra text accompanying note 135.
363. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397.
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worthiness-a search for indicia of reliability.36 The Court in
Evans also looked to the criteria of certainty that the statement
was made and the statement's low incremental probative
value.365 The Inadi Court specified that in addition to indicia of
reliability, certainty that the statement was made, and neces-
sity, the courts should consider the benefit and burden to the
parties.366 Most importantly, the Inadi Court recognized that
co-conspirator statements are highly probative and critical, if
not crucial or devastating.3 6 7 Nevertheless, the Court did not
require production of an available declarant.
3 68
Because the Inadi Court's reliability, necessity, benefit, and
burden analysis admits too much and the Evans Court's crucial
or devastating evidence analysis excludes too much, an inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause is needed that neither
constitutionalizes nor unduly renders unconstitutional the
hearsay rule and its exceptions.
36 9
364. Id. at 392-400; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); see supra text
accompanying notes 170-71.
365. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87-88; see supra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
366. 475 U.S. at 396-400.
367. Id. at 395-96; see supra notes 167-68, 244-45 and accompanying text.
368. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400.
369. The Court in Roberts rejected suggestions that it reevaluate its basic
approach to the confrontation clause. 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980). The Court
wrote:
The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hear-
say rules has triggered an outpouring of scholarly commentary. Few
observers have commented without proposing, roughly or in detail, a
basic approach. Some have advanced theories that would shift the
general mode of analysis in favor of the criminal defendant.
Others have advanced theories that would relax constitutional
restrictions on the use of hearsay by the prosecutor.
Still others have proposed theories that might either help or
hurt the accused.
Finally, a number of commentators, while sometimes criticizing
particular results or language in past decisions, have generally agreed
with the Court's present approach.
Notwithstanding this divergence of critical opinion, we have
found no commentary suggesting that the Court has misidentified the
basic interests to be accommodated. Nor has any commentator
demonstrated that prevailing analysis is out of line with the inten-
tions of the Framers of the Sixth Amendment. Convinced that "no
rule will perfectly resolve all possible problems," we reject the invita-
tion to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence. Our reluctance to
begin anew is heightened by the Court's implicit prior rejection of
principal alternative proposals; the mutually critical character of the
commentary; and the Court's demonstrated success in steering a mid-
die course among proposed alternatives.
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B. THE SUGGESTION
Justice Harlan's concurring opinions in Evans and Green
serve as the starting point for an interpretation of the confron-
tation clause that neither demands a case-by-case evaluation of
reliability nor requires production of every available declarant
of crucial or devastating hearsay.370 Justice Harlan focused on
the "core purpose of the Confrontation Clause." 371 In his con-
currence in Evans, Justice Harlan agreed with Wigmore that
the confrontation clause requires only that testimony admitted
under the rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule and its
exceptions, be subject to cross-examination.37 2 Under this in-
terpretation the confrontation clause prescribes only a rule of
trial procedure. The hearsay rule and its exceptions determine
the admissibility of out-of-court statements, and the confronta-
tion clause guarantees only that the defendant has the right to
cross-examine the in-court declarant with regard to the
statements.
Later in Evans, however, Justice Harlan adverted to an ad-
ditional meaning of the confrontation clause when he at-
tempted to reconcile his view with the holdings of the seven
major Supreme Court confrontation decisions 373 involving in-
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three
Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 73 (1975)).
The Court's decisions in Inadi and Bourjaily may cause the Court to re-
consider its offhand remark that it has not "misidentified the basic interests to
be accommodated" by the confrontation clause. Id.
370. Accord Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A
Peek Forward, 1 HorSTRA L. REV. 32, 42 (1973) (suggesting that an appropriate
place to begin is Justice Harlan's concurrence in Green).
371. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970); see also California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 174-79 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing history of confronta-
tion clause).
372. Justice Harlan stated:
Contrary to things as they appeared to me last Term when I wrote in
California v. Green, I have since become convinced that Wigmore
states the correct view when he says: "The Constitution does not pre-
scribe what kinds of testimonial statements ... shall be given infra-
judicially,-this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being,-
but only what mode of procedure shall be followed-i.e. a cross-exam-
ining procedure-in the case of such testimony as is required by the
ordinary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially."
Evans, 400 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940)).
373. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258
(1904); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1895); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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troduction of former testimony.37 4 By characterizing the issue
in those cases as whether adequate confrontation had taken
place, Harlan found application of the confrontation clause in
those cases consistent with his view of the clause: "In the ab-
sence of countervailing circumstances, introduction of [prior-re-
corded testimony] would be an affront to the core meaning of
the Confrontation Clause. 375 In his concurrence in Green, Jus-
tice Harlan also discussed the core purpose of the clause by
identifying its historical purpose as the prevention of "flagrant
abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee wit-
nesses." 376 The majority in Green similarly defined the core
meaning of the confrontation clause as the defendant's right to
confront the witness at trial. 7
Thus, in Green and Evans, Justice Harlan recognized two
distinct purposes of the confrontation clause: the clause guar-
antees a defendant the right to cross-examine all adverse wit-
nesses present at trial378 and provides a check against "flagrant
abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee wit-
nesses." 379 In Green Justice Harlan argued that the second pur-
pose supported a rule of availability.38 0 Under that view the
declarant's unavailability or production at trial satisfied the
confrontation clause. The prosecution failed to meet the
clause's requirements only through the introduction of a hear-
say statement of a declarant who is available but does not
testify. In Evans, however, Justice Harlan retreated from this
rule of availability, adopting Wigmore's position that the con-
frontation clause requires only that the defendant have an op-
portunity to cross-examine the witnesses that the prosecution
produces. 381 Justice Harlan justified his change in position on
the ground that an availability rule would unduly hamper the
trend in evidence law toward dispensing with the requirement
374. Evans, 400 U.S. at 97.
375. Id. (emphasis added) ("The question in each case, therefore, was
whether there had been adequate 'confrontation' to satisfy the requirement of
the clause. Regardless of the correctness of the results, the holding that the
clause was applicable in those situations is consistent with the view of the
clause I have taken.").
376. Green, 399 U.S. at 179.
377. Id. at 181 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43); see supra note 327.
378. The importance of cross-examination is seen in Town of Geneva v.
Tills, 129 Wis. 2d 167, 178-79, 384 N.W.2d 701, 706 (1986) (holding telephonic
testimony inadmissible when defendant was denied meaningful cross-
examination).
379. Green, 399 U.S. at 179.
380. Id. at 174, 179, 186, 188-89.
381. 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970).
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of availability for those classes of reliable hearsay, such as busi-
ness records, trade reports, and laboratory reports, in which
cross-examination is of little utility to the opponent.382 Under
the approach Justice Harlan adopted in Evans, if the declarant
is unavailable, only the rules of evidence and the requirements
of due process govern the admissibility of a hearsay declaration,
and the confrontation clause guarantees only the defendant's
right to cross-examine the in-court witness. 383 If the declarant
is available and testifies, the confrontation clause again requires
that the defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine. Up
to this point, Justice Harlan's analysis in Evans yields the same
results as his analysis in Green, which was based on the core
meaning of the confrontation clause. In the case of the avail-
able but nontestifying declarant, however, Justice Harlan ar-
gued in Evans that the confrontation clause requires only that
the defendant can cross-examine the in-court witness, and that
the constitutional admissibility of the hearsay declaration is re-
viewed solely against the due process standard of fundamental
fairness. 384 In this situation, as Justice Harlan seemed to recog-
nize in his discussion of the former testimony cases, his view of
the confrontation clause is incompatible with its core mean-
ing.38 5 Justice Harlan thus ascribed a core purpose to the con-
frontation clause, but he interpreted the clause in a manner
that precluded effectuation of that purpose. If the right of con-
frontation never compels the prosecution to produce available
witnesses, it cannot serve its historical function of preventing
"flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee
witnesses. ' 386 On the other hand, Justice Harlan's concern that
the confrontation clause not require production of all available
witnesses is legitimate.
382. Id. at 95-96.
383. For a Note advancing a similar position, see Note, Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1438 (1966). Justice Harlan in his concur-
rence in Green acknowledged that the right to cross-examination is also an el-
ement of due process. 399 U.S. at 186 n.20; cf. Note, The Burger Court and the
Confrontation Clause: A Return to the Fair Trial Rule, 7 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 136 (1973) (Supreme Court reverting to a due process analysis
of confrontation).
384. 400 U.S. at 94-97.
385. In Green Justice Harlan stated that "Wigmore's reading would have
the practical consequence of rendering meaningless what was assuredly in
some sense meant to be an enduring guarantee." 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970).
386. Id.; accord United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 411 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("The plight of Sir Walter Raleigh, condemned on the deposition of an al-
leged accomplice who had since recanted, may have loomed large in the eyes
of those who drafted that constitutional guarantee.").
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There is, fortunately, an intermediate position that neither
unduly restricts the use of reliable hearsay evidence in criminal
prosecutions nor conflicts with the core meaning of the con-
frontation clause. In interpreting the language of the confron-
tation clause that "the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him,' '387 courts have ap-
parently assumed that every hearsay statement the prosecution
introduces is a statement of a witness against the defendant.388
This assumption is valid if the statement is judged from the
viewpoint of its use at trial. A better approach, however, is to
judge the statement from the viewpoint of the circumstances
under which it was initially made.
Under this approach, when the prosecution offers an out-
of-court statement under a hearsay exemption or exception, the
confrontation clause requires the prosecution to produce the
declarant only if the declarant is available and then only if the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement indi-
cate that it was accusatory when made. If the out-of-court
statement was accusatory when made, the declarant is a wit-
ness against the defendant. Conversely, if the out-of-court
statement was not accusatory, the declarant is not a witness
against the defendant, and the confrontation clause has no ap-
plication. This approach satisfies the core meaning of the con-
frontation clause, preventing "flagrant abuses, trials by
anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses."3 89 In addition,
the approach comports with the perception of fairness that the
Supreme Court has articulated.390 This interpretation of the
right of confrontation, unlike the rule of availability espoused
by Justice Harlan in Green, does not substantially impair the
387. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
389. Green, 399 U.S. at 179. For a pre-Roberts, pre-Inadi, and pre-Bouijaily
version of the witness against the defendant theory of the confrontation
clause, see generally Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule and
the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151 (1978).
390. In Lee v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (1986), the Court stated:
On one level, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal jus-
tice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails.
To foster such a system, the Constitution provides certain safeguards
to promote to the greatest possible degree society's interest in having
the accused and accuser engage in an open and even contest in a pub-
lic trial. The Confrontation Clause advances these goals by ensuring
that convictions will not be based on the charges of unseen and un-
known--and hence unchallengeable-individuals.
Id. at 2062 (emphasis added).
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usefulness of the hearsay exceptions because out-of-court state-
ments admitted under hearsay exceptions such as those for
business records, learned treatises, or trade reports typically
are not accusatory when made.
All witnesses the prosecution calls at trial are witnesses
against the defendant, whether the witnesses are testifying
about their own out-of-court declarations or merely repeating
the out-of-court declarations of others. Prosecution witnesses
are against the defendant not because their testimony will usu-
ally be damaging, but because the witnesses are aware that
their testimony is elicited by the party accusing the defendant
of committing the crime charged. Consequently, the right of
confrontation described by Justice Harlan in Evans-the right
to cross-examine prosecution witnesses present at trial-is al-
ways to be afforded the defendant.
Most important, the suggested interpretation is consistent
with the core meaning ascribed to the confrontation clause.391
That meaning reflects a concern that the prosecution will avoid
producing witnesses at trial by soliciting written statements
such as depositions, letters, and affidavits that incriminate par-
ticular defendants. The suggested interpretation precludes
such practices because all hearsay declarations solicited by the
prosecution will be accusatory in nature and therefore constitu-
tionally inadmissible at trial unless the declarant is either pro-
duced at trial or truly unavailable. The suggested
interpretation clearly prohibits the showing of a videotaped ex
parte statement made in preparation for trial by a declarant
who is available but not called by the prosecution at trial, as
391. For discussion of the origin and development of the hearsay rules and
the confrontation clause, see F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (1951); 9 W. HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 177-87, 214-19 (3d ed. 1944); Griswold, The Due Process Revolu-
tion and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 713-26 (1971); Morgan, Hear-
say Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV.
177, 179-85 (1948); Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to
Prepare a Defense, 56 GEO. L.J. 939, 953 (1968); Note, Preserving the Right to
Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (1965). After surveying most of these authorities,
Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence in Green: "[M]y own research satis-
fies me that the prevailing view-that the usual primary sources and digests of
the early debates contain no informative material on the confrontation right-
is correct." 399 U.S. at 176 n.8. Similarly, in Evans Harlan concluded that "the
historical understanding of the clause furnishes no solid guide to adjudica-
tion." 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970).
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provided in the Texas-type statutes considered above.392
A statement is accusatory in nature under this analysis if it
is made under circumstances that evince either an intent of the
declarant to accuse someone with conduct that is criminal or an
awareness by the declarant of a reasonable possibility that the
statement may be of assistance to the authorities in the appre-
hension or prosecution of any person who may be charged with
having committed a crime. Because every witness is probably
aware that statements given to persons in authority, such as po-
lice officers or government attorneys, may be of assistance in
the apprehension or prosecution of a criminal defendant, such
statements are always accusatory regardless of their content.
For example, ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by ex-
amining magistrates and confessions of accomplices 393 are
accusatory.
Statements admitted under hearsay exceptions such as
those for spontaneous declarations, learned treatises, and busi-
ness records, on the other hand, are not likely to be accusatory.
Each hearsay statement must be judged individually.394 For ex-
392. See supra notes 64-66, 316-21 and accompanying text. As stated by
Justice White, writing for the majority in Green:
[Tihe particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was
the practice of trying defendants on "evidence" which consisted solely
of ex :parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magis-
trates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his
accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact....
"The proof was usually given by reading depositions, confessions of
accomplices, letters, and the like; and this occasioned frequent de-
mands by the prisoner to have his 'accusers,' i.e. the witnesses against
him, brought before him face to face ......
399 U.S. at 156-57 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRnIMNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)).
393. Id. at 156-57.
394. An examination of how the suggested interpretation would affect ad-
mission of out-of-court statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence illus-
trates the utility of the approach. Rules 801(d)(1) and 801(d)(2) define certain
out-of-court statements as "not hearsay." Rule 801(d)(1), which concerns prior
statements by the in-court witness, requires the declarant to be present at trial
and subject to cross-examination, so the confrontation clause is always satis-
fied. Under Rule 802(d)(2), which concerns admissions by a party-opponent,
each of the five subdivisions is designed to ensure the responsibility of the
party-opponent for the content of the statement. As to subdivisions (A), (B),
and (C) of Rule 801(d)(2), it is difficult in the abstract to conceive of a situa-
tion in which the confrontation clause would be applicable. A party will usu-
ally not authorize or adopt another's statement that is accusatory in nature,
and the state could not call a defendant to testify against himself concerning
his own statement. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (applying fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to states through fourteenth
amendment). Under subdivision (D) of Rule 801(d)(2), the requirement that
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ample, in a murder prosecution, a sales record offered by the
prosecution showing that the defendant had recently purchased
the murder weapon would be admissible as substantive evi-
the statement must concern a matter within the scope of the agency or em-
ployment will operate to exclude most statements accusatory in nature. If,
however, a statement is accusatory and related to a matter within the scope of
employment, the suggested interpretation would require production of the de-
clarant if she was available. Finally, a statement must be in furtherance of a
conspiracy in order to satisfy subdivision (E) of Rule 801(d)(2) and is thus un-
likely to be made under circumstances accusatory in nature.
Under Rule 803 facts surrounding the creation of the hearsay declaration
will determine whether an available declarant must be produced. Consider,
for example, the admission under the business records exception of a medical
examination conducted in a private hospital for presence of sperm. See FED.
R. EVID. 803(6). If the examination was at the state attorney's request or by
reason of law, it is part of the accusatory, investigatory process and the con-
frontation clause applies. On the other hand, if the examination was con-
ducted for the purpose of providing health care for the patient, the
confrontation clause would not apply. An easier example is the admission
under the exception for public records and reports of a police laboratory re-
port that a bullet was fired from a particular gun. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
The police lab is part of the state criminal enforcement process. Because the
report was made with the intention and for the purpose of solving crimes, it is
accusatory in nature even though the person performing the test was unaware
of the defendant, and therefore the confrontation clause applies.
Under Rule 803(8), which applies to the police laboratory report and may
apply to the medical sperm analysis, neither statement would be admissible
since each was made as part of the investigatory process. Rule 803 creates an
exception for:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office
or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in
criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law en-
forcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, un-
less the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
The Advisory Committee's Note states that factual findings are not admis-
sible under subdivision (C) in criminal cases when offered against the accused
"in view of the almost certain collision with confrontation rights." FED. R.
EVID. 803 advisory committee note. Notice also that the exception provided for
in subdivision (B) does not extend to matters "observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel." FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(B). Such statements
are prime examples of statements accusatory in nature, and the Congressional
debates reflected the concern embodied in the core meaning of the confronta-
tion clause that such statements may not be reliable and that the defendant
should have the right to cross-examine the makers of accusatory statements:
[Mr. Dennis.] What I am saying here is that in a criminal case, only,
we should not be able to put in the police report to prove your case
without calling the policeman. I think in a criminal case you ought to
have to call the policeman.., and give the defendant the chance to
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dence if properly authenticated under the business records
hearsay exception.395 The confrontation clause would not apply
to the offer because the making of the sales record occurred
under circumstances that negate any intent by the sales clerk
to accuse the defendant of criminal conduct.396 Likewise, the
confrontation clause would not apply to require the prosecution
to produce the author of the learned treatise that. was offered
by a medical examiner in support of the examiner's conclusion
about the cause of death 97 because the writing of the treatise
occurred under circumstances that negate any intent by the au-
thor to accuse the. defendant. Finally, the confrontation clause
would not require the production of a custodian who certifies
that the Internal Revenue Service possesses no record of a tax
return having been filed by the defendant for a specific year398
cross examine him, rather than just reading the report into evi-
dence ....
I think the point is that we are dealing here with criminal
cases, and in a criminal case the defendant should be confronted with
the accuser to give him the chance to cross examine.
120 CONG. REc. 2387-88 (1974).
Finally, because unavailability is a prerequisite for each of the five excep-
tions of Rule 804, under the suggested interpretation the confrontation clause
would always be satisfied for statements admitted pursuant to those excep-
tions. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1)-(5).
395. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
396. In United States v. Lloyd, 431 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 403
U.S. 911 (1971), the Ninth Circuit reached the same result in a similar situa-
tion. Defendant was convicted under the Selective Service Act for refusal to
report for induction. Id. at 163. At trial the government offered only a certi-
fied and authenticated copy of Lloyd's selective service file and called no wit-
nesses. Id. The court affirmed the conviction, overruling defendant's sixth
amendment confrontation challenge. Id. at 163-64, 172.
397. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
398. See FED. R. EVID. 803(10); see also United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d
20, 26 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding prohibitions of Rule 803(8) do not extend to Rule
803(10)). The court explained:
[Tihere is a significant difference between the nature of a statement
envisioned by Rule 803(8) and that of a statement envisioned by Rule
803(10). Rule 803(8) deals with statements setting forth "matters ob-
served" and "findings of fact resulting from an investigation." The
contents of these statements normally are direct affirmative asser-
tions as to elements of the offense charged. In Oates, for example, the
report and worksheet stated that the substance seized was heroin; in
United States v. Davis ... the reports stated dates and places of
purchases of a firearm. The assertion made by a statement envisioned
by 803(10) is normally a step removed from any element of the of-
fense charged. it is not a statement that the defendant has failed to
perform a given act or that he does not enjoy a certain status. Rather
it is a statement that, among the records regularly kept by a public
office or agency, a certain record, entry, report, etc., has not been
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because the defendant did not prepare the tax return under cir-
cumstances accusatory to himself. The suggested approach fo-
cuses on the circumstances surrounding the underlying hearsay
declaration, not the method of authentication of the declaration
in court.399
Under the suggested interpretation, although each state-
ment must be considered in light of surrounding circumstances,
questions of interpretation should be few. Statements charging
someone with a crime will almost always take the form of an
accusation, complaint, or notification such as "Bob raped me"
or "Come quick, Sam is robbing the bank." Statements made
by declarants aware of a reasonable possibility that the state-
ment may assist the authorities in apprehending or prosecuting
a person charged with committing a crime will almost always
be made to a law enforcement officer. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8)(B) precludes the use of the public record excep-
tion to introduce statements to police officers. The
considerations underlying the exclusion are the same as those
that should require the production of an available declarant of
an otherwise admissible statement made to a police officer.400
found. This type of statement is an inferential step away from any el-
ement of the offense charged. It is not a finding of the material fact
but is an assertion from which a finding of such a fact may be made.
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 1977)).
399. For example, the interpretation of "matters observed" in Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(8)(B) is consistent with and supportive of the proposed inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause. "Matters observed" has been held not to
include records created routinely and ministerially in advance of and not asso-
ciated with a particular criminal investigation. See, e.g., United States v.
Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding warrant of deportation ad-
missible); see also United States v. Hardin, 710 F.2d 1231, 1237 (7th Cir.) (find-
ing statistical graph showing street value of heroin admissible), cert denied,
464 U.S. 918 (1983).
400. FED. R. EVi. 803 Senate Judiciary Committee report. The report
stated:
The House approved rule 803(8), as submitted by the Supreme Court,
with one substantive change. It excluded from the hearsay exception
reports containing matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel in criminal cases. Ostensibly, the reason for
this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the
crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as ob-
servations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial
nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in
criminal cases.
Id.
The concept applies to Rule 803(8)(C) as well. See FED. R. EvID. 803 advi-
sory committee's note. The Advisory Committee stated:
The formulation of an approach which would give appropriate weight
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To illustrate, assume that Ms. Smith was just outside the
bank as Bill Bumber was robbing it. As Bumber left the bank,
he noticed Ms. Smith and pointed his gun at her. She screamed
for all to hear, "Bill Bumber, please don't shoot me." Bumber
then fled the scene. As Ms. Smith turned, she saw a police of-
ficer and immediately shouted, "There goes Bill Bumber. He
just robbed the bank. Be careful-he's got a gun." At
Bumber's trial the prosecution calls, on the issue of identity,
the police officer to testify that he heard both statements and
to relate their contents. Both statements appear to meet the
present sense impression 40 1 and excited utterance exceptions 40 2
to the hearsay rule. Whether the defendant's right of confron-
tation requires the prosecution to account for Ms. Smith's non-
appearance before the officer may testify to the statements he
overheard should depend on whether the statements were ac-
cusatory when made.
Ms. Smith's first statement-"Bill Bumber, please don't
shoot me"--was not accusatory when made. Ms. Smith did not
have the purpose of imputing criminal conduct to Bumber or of
accusing him of anything, but only of persuading Bumber not
to hurt her. Nor did Ms. Smith make the statement at the be-
hest of a police officer or other authority figure whom Ms.
Smith might anticipate would be involved in investigating or
prosecuting the robbery. Thus, as to Ms. Smith's first state-
ment, she is not a witness against defendant Bumber, and the
confrontation clause should not apply to the admission of the
hearsay statement. On the other hand, Ms. Smith's second
statement, which she directed to the police officer, was accusa-
tory when made. Ms. Smith had the purpose of charging
Bumber with criminal conduct, and she could reasonably antici-
pate that the statement would assist the authorities in appre-
hending and prosecuting Bumber. Accordingly, even though
the second statement would be substantively admissible under
the rules of evidence without regard to availability, the con-
to all possible factors in every situation is an obvious impossibility.
Hence the rule, as in Exception (6), assumes admissibility in the first
instance but with ample provision for escape if sufficient negative fac-
tors are present. In one respect, however, the rule with respect to
evaluative reports under item (c) is very specific; they are admissible
only in civil cases and against the government in criminal cases in
view of the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which
would result from their use against the accused in a criminal case.
Id.
401. FED. R. EvD. 803(1).
402. FED. R. EviD. 803(2).
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frontation clause should require that the prosecution account
for Ms. Smith's nonappearance before the police officer testifies
about the contents of the statement.
Returning to the hypothetical case of Alice, five of Alice's
six statements were made under circumstances that should re-
quire her production at trial or a showing of unavailability
before they may be admitted in satisfaction of the confrontation
clause. Each assertion contains an accusation. To the extent
that each statement seeks prevention of future occurrences or
identifies the defendant, the confrontation clause should re-
quire Alice's appearance or unavailability. Only the statement
to the examining physician may not implicate the confrontation
clause, and then only to the extent the statement seeks physi-
cal medical treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current confrontation clause analysis focusing on reliabil-
ity, and correspondingly the utility of cross-examination, neces-
sity, benefit, and burden is, as Justice Harlan has said, not well
suited for testing the rules of evidence. 40 3 The error in previ-
ous confrontation clause analysis is that hearsay declarants
were deemed witnesses against the defendant on the sole
ground that the prosecution offered the hearsay declaration at
trial. A better interpretation of the confrontation clause is that
a nonappearing but available hearsay declarant is a witness
against the defendant only if the circumstances surrounding
the making of the declaration indicate that it was accusatory in
nature when made. Under this interpretation, the confronta-
tion clause could be restated as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
present and to cross-examine his accusers if they are available.
The right of confrontation would still prescribe only a rule
of preference and would be satisfied whenever a declarant was
truly unavailable. The defendant would retain the right to
cross-examine every witness that the prosecution produces at
trial. As to available witnesses not produced, however, the con-
frontation clause would bar only the admission of hearsay dec-
larations accusatory in nature when made. As suggested by
Harlan, the command of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
that federal and state trials be conducted in accordance with
403. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
supra note 351 (quoting Evans, 400 U.S. at 96).
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due process of law would determine the appropriateness of evi-
dentiary rules.40 4 This interpretation would have the salutary
result that the confrontation clause would not apply to state-
ments admitted under most hearsay exceptions and thus would
not impair the usefulness of those exceptions. Moreover, the
interpretation would not constitutionalize the hearsay rule and
its exceptions, and it would satisfy the core meaning of the con-
frontation clause.
404. Evans, 400 U.S. at 96-97.
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